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16 April 2014 
Dear Mr President 
Dear Madam Speaker 
The Australian National Audit Office has undertaken an independent 
performance audit in the Department of Defence titled Emergency 
Defence Assistance to the Civil Community. The audit was conducted in 
accordance with the authority contained in the Auditor-General 
Act 1997. Pursuant to Senate Standing Order 166 relating to the 
presentation of documents when the Senate is not sitting, I present the 
report of this audit to the Parliament. 
Following its presentation and receipt, the report will be placed on the 





The Honourable the President of the Senate 
The Honourable the Speaker of the House of Representatives 
Parliament House 
Canberra  ACT 
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flood  or  cyclone,  or  result  from  human  activities.1  Emergencies  occur 
frequently  in  Australia  and  range  in  severity  from  small‐scale  incidents  to 
large‐scale, catastrophic events. The human and economic cost of these events 
can  be  substantial.  For  example,  the  Black  Saturday  bushfires  in Victoria  in 
2009  claimed  the  lives  of  173  people,  affected  over  78  communities  and 
destroyed 2029 homes; and the insured cost for losses due to Cyclone Oswald 
in  2013 was  estimated  at  $1.1 billion  in Queensland  and New  South Wales, 
with $154 million  in State and Australian Government assistance provided  to 
those affected.2 
2. A  well‐directed,  coordinated  and  timely  emergency  management 
response acts to minimise the impact of an emergency on the community and 
support  the  recovery  process.  When  a  natural  disaster  or  other  domestic 
emergency  occurs,  it  is  primarily  the  responsibility  of  the  relevant  state  or 
territory (state) government to protect life, property and the environment. State 
governments draw on a range of emergency services, volunteer organisations 
and  commercial  resources  when  responding  to  emergencies.  State 
governments  may  also  request  Australian  Government  non‐financial 
assistance to provide additional resources for response and recovery activities.3 
3. The Department  of Defence  (Defence) undertakes  a  large majority  of 
Australian  Government  emergency  assistance  tasks  in  response  to  state 
requests. When Defence accepts a request and provides emergency assistance, 
this  is referred  to as emergency  ‘Defence Assistance  to  the Civil Community’ 
(DACC). The benefits of utilising Defence  in support of emergency responses 
include  that Defence  is often able  to deploy Australian Defence Force  (ADF) 
                                                     
1  The terms ‘emergency’ and ‘disaster’ are often used interchangeably by organisations involved in 
emergency/disaster response to describe events which require special arrangements to manage the 
situation. Criteria used to define ‘disaster’ can be found at Emergency Management Australia, Disaster 
Information, [Internet], EMA, available from <http://www.emknowledge.gov.au/disaster-information> 
[accessed 4 November 2013]. 
2  Emergency Management Australia, Knowledge Hub, [Internet], EMA, available from 
<http://www.emknowledge.gov.au/disaster-information> [accessed 28 January 2014]. 
3  Non-financial assistance can include, but is not limited to: planning, expertise, provision of mapping 
services, counseling, advice, management of external resources and physical assistance. Emergency 
Management Australia, Australian Government Disaster Response Plan (COMDISPLAN), 2013, p. 5. 
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example,  engineers),  as well  as  equipment  (from  transport  aircraft  to water 
purification units). Defence may also have the capacity to deploy its personnel 
and equipment at relatively short notice due to the geographical proximity of 








Australian Government and Defence emergency assistance 
arrangements 
5. The Attorney‐General’s Department, through Emergency Management 
Australia  (EMA),  develops  and  maintains  the  Australian  Government’s 
emergency  management  policy  and  plans.  The  Australian  Government 
Disaster Response Plan is known as COMDISPLAN. This plan outlines request 
and  coordination  arrangements  for  providing  Australian  Government 
emergency assistance, in the event of an emergency in Australia or its offshore 
territories. One of  the guiding principles of COMDISPLAN  is  that,  ‘Before a 
request  is made under COMDISPLAN a  jurisdiction must have exhausted all 
government, community and commercial options to provide that effect’.5  
6. The arrangements established by COMDISPLAN apply  to  emergency 
DACC. The provision of emergency DACC is also governed by Defence policy 
and procedures. Defence Instructions (General) OPS 05‐1: Defence Assistance to the 
Civil  Community  —  policy  and  procedures  (the  Instruction)  applied  until 
December  2012.  The  Instruction  was  replaced  at  this  time  by  the  Defence 
Assistance to the Civil Community Manual (DACC Manual), which states that: 
Emergency Defence Assistance  to  the Civil Community  (DACC)  is  support 
provided to the civil community where immediate action is necessary to save 
                                                     
4  This report identifies shortcomings in Defence’s emergency DACC task recordkeeping. The actual 
number of emergency DACC tasks for the period 2005–06 to 2012–13 is higher than that recorded by 
Defence. 
5  Emergency Management Australia, Australian Government Disaster Response Plan (COMDISPLAN), 
2013, p. 6.  
Summary 
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widespread  loss/damage  to  property  or  to  prevent  environmental  damage, 
and  when  State/Territory  resources  are  inadequate.  It  also  encompasses 
assistance associated with the recovery from an emergency or disaster.6 
7. The  DACC  Manual  recognises  two  types  of  DACC:  emergency  and 
non‐emergency. Emergency DACC  is divided  into  three categories according 
to the type and duration of assistance: local emergency assistance (category 1); 




emergency,  Australian  Government  resources  may  be  deployed  in 
support  of  state  authorities  for  limited  periods  without  the  need  to 
activate  COMDISPLAN.7  In  this  situation,  regional,  district  or  local 
emergency  management  authorities  may  request  assistance  directly 
from an ADF unit located in the affected area. Local ADF commanders 
decide  whether  to  undertake  the  task,  taking  into  account  available 
resources and priorities. This  type of assistance  is classified as DACC 
category 1. 
 For  more  extensive  or  ongoing  emergency  situations,  or  assistance 
associated with  recovery  from  a  civil  emergency or disaster,  requests 
for  Australian  Government  assistance  must  be  approved  and 
coordinated through EMA, under  the guidance of COMDISPLAN. On 
the  receipt  of  a  state  government  request,  EMA  determines  the 
Australian Government organisation best placed to undertake the task. 
EMA  informed  the  Australian  National  Audit  Office  (ANAO)  that 





6  Department of Defence, Defence Assistance to the Civil Community Manual, 2012, paragraph 3.1. 
7  Emergency Management Australia, Australian Government Disaster Response Plan (COMDISPLAN), 
2013, p. 6. 
8  EMA informed the ANAO that 80 per cent is an overall average which can vary greatly depending on 
the disaster. For example, some emergencies will see more, or less, requests for assistance tasked to 
Defence, depending on the type of disaster and the assistance required.  
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6  Department of Defence, Defence Assistance to the Civil Community Manual, 2012, paragraph 3.1. 
7  Emergency Management Australia, Australian Government Disaster Response Plan (COMDISPLAN), 
2013, p. 6. 
8  EMA informed the ANAO that 80 per cent is an overall average which can vary greatly depending on 
the disaster. For example, some emergencies will see more, or less, requests for assistance tasked to 
Defence, depending on the type of disaster and the assistance required.  
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Audit objective, criteria and scope 
8. The  audit  objective  was  to  assess  the  administrative  effectiveness  of 
Defence’s procedures to provide emergency assistance to the civil community. 
9. Four  high‐level  criteria  were  developed  to  assist  in  evaluating 
Defence’s performance in terms of the audit objective: 




with  other  agencies  to  provide  emergency  assistance,  including with 
state emergency management authorities; and 
 Defence  divisions  with  responsibility  for  emergency  assistance  are 




did  not  address  Defence’s  management  of  non‐emergency  DACC  or  the 
conduct of Defence operations. 
Overall conclusion 
11. Under  national  emergency  management  arrangements,  state  and 
territory  (state)  governments  have  primary  responsibility  for  protecting  life, 
property  and  the  environment  in  the  event  of  an  emergency  in  their 
jurisdiction. When state resources are inadequate, the Australian Government 
can be called upon to provide assistance, representing a ‘surge’ capacity within 
the  federation. Some of  the  skills and assets  available  to Defence  to  conduct 
military operations can be  readily applied  in support of states  responding  to 
natural  disasters  and  other  emergencies,  and  as  a  consequence  there  is  a 
regular demand  for Defence assistance. Defence can provide assistance either 
directly  for  local  emergency  assistance  (category  1  tasks),  or  through 
Emergency Management Australia (EMA) for significant emergency assistance 
(category  2  tasks)  and  emergency  recovery  assistance  (category  3  tasks). 
Defence’s  emergency  Defence  Assistance  to  the  Civil  Community  (DACC) 
procedures therefore need to establish clear decision making, coordination and 
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dependent  on  the  quality  of  relationships  across  the  areas  of  Defence  with 
emergency  DACC  roles,  and  between  Defence,  EMA  and  state  emergency 
management authorities. It also depends on a strong feedback loop so that on‐
the‐ground experience informs future operations. 
13. In recent years Defence has played a prominent role  in responding  to 
natural  disasters  in  Australia.  As  part  of  five  major  emergency  DACC 
operations  between  2008–09  and  2012–13,  Defence  has  deployed  significant 
human  and  physical  resources,  organised  in  Joint  Task  Forces  (JTF)9,  to 
provide assistance  to  state emergency management authorities. For example, 
Defence assistance  to  the 2009 Black Saturday bushfires  in Victoria reached a 
peak operational strength of approximately 800 Defence personnel per day10, 
and over 1250 Defence personnel provided assistance over the seven weeks of 
the  operation.  For  these  major  operations,  Defence  also  recorded  supplier 





in  guiding  and  enabling  the  provision  of  Defence  assistance  in  response  to 
emergencies. The DACC Manual outlines principles for Defence commanders 
to  consider  when  judging  the  merits  of  requests  for  Defence  assistance, 
including  the need  to evaluate  the  readiness of Defence  resources  to achieve 
the  Government’s  expected  defence  outcomes  against  the  capacity  to  make 
those same resources available  in an emergency. Defence has also developed 
sound  coordination  arrangements  with  state  emergency  management 
authorities,  involving  the  appointment  of  Defence  liaison  officers,  who 
communicate  with  states  about  their  emergency  assistance  needs  and 
Defence’s capability to provide support, both prior to and during emergencies. 
                                                     
9  Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 3.14 defines a JTF as a force composed of assigned or 
attached elements of two or more Services established for the purpose of carrying out a specific task 
or mission. 
10  Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 2008–09, Volume 1, 2009, p. 137.  
11  These supplier expenses do not include the cost of Defence personnel or the cost of depreciation of 
Defence assets utilised in emergency DACC tasks. 
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Emergency  management  authorities  interviewed  as  part  of  this  audit 
acknowledged  the  responsiveness  of  Defence  and  the  value  of  the  support 
provided. However, emergency DACC has been  largely  focused on  response 
efforts, with  less  attention given  to meeting  the  administrative  requirements 
set out  in  the DACC Manual, particularly  in  the areas of  task  recordkeeping 
and  cost  recovery.  There  is  also  scope  for  Defence  to  develop  a  stronger 
feedback loop to inform decision making on future emergency DACC delivery 
approaches. 
15. While  emergency  DACC  is  only  a  small  part  of  Defence’s  overall 
responsibilities,  it  can  involve a  large number of Defence personnel, and  the 
utilisation of valuable Defence equipment and supplies. In  the circumstances, 
there  is  a  need  for  Defence  to  develop  straightforward  administrative 
requirements. The  Instruction of 2004 and  the DACC Manual of 2012 set out 
extensive  reporting  requirements  for  individual  DACC  tasks,  indicating  a 
desire by Defence to understand the nature and cost of the provision of DACC, 
and  to  learn  from experience. However,  for many years Defence has not met 
these  requirements  across  the DACC  tasks  it undertakes. The main  focus  of 
Defence  units  has  been  to  complete  tasks,  and  they  have  not  prioritised 
reporting  on  tasks  outside  of  the  Service  chain  of  command.  The  failure  to 
record  key  task  data  means  that  other  areas  of  Defence  responsible  for 
emergency  DACC  strategy,  procedures  and  reporting  are  not  routinely 
informed  about  the  nature,  resource  impact  and  cost  of  emergency  DACC 
tasks,  as well  as  any  task  acceptance  and  delivery  issues.  To  address  these 
issues, Defence should review  task  reporting  requirements  to ensure  they do 
not present an unnecessary administrative burden, but instead give priority to 
meeting an appropriate set of requirements  that generates useful  information 
to  help  shape  future  emergency  DACC  activities  while  satisfying 
recordkeeping requirements for accountability purposes. 
16. To  further  encourage  states  to  manage  emergency  recovery  efforts 
using  their own  resources,  the DACC Manual  requires  that  the direct  costs12 
incurred by Defence in undertaking category 3 ‘recovery’ tasks be reimbursed 
by  states,  and  only  allows  the  ‘waiver’  of  cost  recovery  in  limited  ‘special 
                                                     
12  Direct costs include the cost of the workforce, fuel, spares, stores and the cost of repairing Defence 
platforms. Direct costs are normally presented as a per/day or per/hour cost. 
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its  current  policy,  Defence  has  advised  that  it  plans  to  amend  the  DACC 
Manual  to  indicate  that  costs  are  ‘generally  not  recovered  unless  the 
government recipient agrees to pay costs’, and that cost recovery ‘may not be 
warranted  where  it  is  not  cost  effective  or  it  would  be  inconsistent  with 
government  policy  objectives’.  However,  this  approach  does  not  clarify  the 
circumstances in which cost recovery is warranted and Defence personnel are 
obliged to pursue the recovery of costs. While it is a decision for Defence and 
the Government,  the ANAO suggests  that Defence review and clarify  its cost 
recovery policy for emergency DACC, and develop practical thresholds for the 
application  of  cost  recovery,  in  terms  of  the  estimated  value  and  type  of 
recovery assistance provided. Pursuing such an approach would reinforce the 
responsibility  of  state  governments  for  emergency  recovery  when  the 
immediate threat to life, property and the environment has passed.  
17. The  emergent  nature  of  emergency  DACC  tasks  means  that  it  is 
difficult  to  develop  and  apply  objective  measures  of  performance. 
Nevertheless,  identifying  lessons  from emergency DACC activities,  including 
the efficiency and effectiveness of the approaches adopted remains important. 
Defence has established some elements of an emergency DACC evaluation and 
learning  system,  including  reports  on  major  operations14  and  an  annual 
Lessons  Board.  The  Lessons  Board  considers  key  themes  arising  from  these 
reports, and can recommend procedural changes to improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of emergency DACC. However, these elements are not currently 
supported by  an  information  system  to  record  and manage key  lessons  and 
recommendations arising  from DACC activities,  creating a  risk  that  learning 
will  be  lost  and  actions  not  pursued.  The  initial  roll‐out  of  a Defence‐wide 
system  for managing  lessons  learned  is planned  for  July 2014, presenting an 
opportunity  for  Defence  to  develop  a  stronger  feedback  loop  to  inform 
improvement  in  the  administration  and  delivery  of  emergency  DACC 
activities. 
18. Within  Defence,  various  office  holders,  Groups  and  Services  have 
different emergency DACC responsibilities, ranging from the development of 
                                                     
13  Category 3 tasks are not directly related to saving life and property and are subject to cost recovery. 
DACC Category 1 and 2 tasks are directly related to saving life and property and are not subject to 
cost recovery. See Table 2.1 on page 40 for details. 
14  Emergency DACC operations involve many individual DACC tasks. 
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strategy and procedures  to  the completion of  tasks. The audit highlights  that 
the  overall  effectiveness  of  emergency  DACC  administrative  arrangements 
depends on  the  collective  contribution of all of  these areas  toward planning, 
delivery,  monitoring  and  review  efforts.  To  this  end,  the  ANAO  has 
recommended that Defence review the minimum  information necessary to be 
reported  for  each  emergency  DACC  task  for  planning,  management  and 
accountability purposes. The recommendation also encourages Defence to take 
steps  to  strengthen  the  priority  afforded  by  Defence  units  to  meeting 
mandatory reporting requirements.15 
Key findings by chapter 
Defence emergency assistance framework (Chapter 2) 
19. Defence’s primary focus is to advance Australia’s strategic interests by 
developing  the armed  forces and  conducting military operations, as directed 
by  the  Government.  Defence  is  also  able  to  assist  the  civil  community  in 
Australia during emergency situations, in a supporting role to state emergency 
services authorities, utilising  its available capabilities. At the government and 
community  levels,  the provision of DACC can be highly visible and result  in 
favourable  media  coverage.  This  can  lead  to  further  requests  and  greater 
expectations  for Defence support, potentially stretching available capabilities. 
To  address  this  set  of  issues, Defence’s DACC Manual  includes  clear policy 
and  guidance,  which  informs  Defence  decision  makers  about  the 
circumstances and  limitations applying  to  the acceptance of DACC  requests. 
Defence has also actively engaged with emergency assistance stakeholders  to 
build  understanding  of Defence’s  supporting  role  and  capability  to  provide 
emergency assistance. 
20. Defence has established different emergency DACC management and 
administrative  requirements according  to  three  ‘categories’ or  types of  tasks. 
The  emergency DACC  categories  enable  local Defence  commanders  to make 
on‐the‐ground  decisions  and  apply  base  resources  in  response  to  localised 
emergencies  (category  1);  and  provide  for  higher  level  Defence  decision 
making  and  coordination  in  response  to  more  extensive  or  large‐scale 
emergency  situations  (category  2  and  3).  The  categorisation  of  emergency 
                                                     
15  The audit report also suggests that Defence clarify cost recovery policy for emergency DACC 
category 3 ‘recovery’ tasks, and centrally review the content of regional DACC plans on an annual 
basis. These suggestions are discussed in the key findings at paragraphs 21 and 24. 
  
ANAO Audit Report No.24 2013–14 
Emergency Defence Assistance to the Civil Community 
 
18 
strategy and procedures  to  the completion of  tasks. The audit highlights  that 
the  overall  effectiveness  of  emergency  DACC  administrative  arrangements 
depends on  the  collective  contribution of all of  these areas  toward planning, 
delivery,  monitoring  and  review  efforts.  To  this  end,  the  ANAO  has 
recommended that Defence review the minimum  information necessary to be 
reported  for  each  emergency  DACC  task  for  planning,  management  and 
accountability purposes. The recommendation also encourages Defence to take 
steps  to  strengthen  the  priority  afforded  by  Defence  units  to  meeting 
mandatory reporting requirements.15 
Key findings by chapter 
Defence emergency assistance framework (Chapter 2) 
19. Defence’s primary focus is to advance Australia’s strategic interests by 
developing  the armed  forces and  conducting military operations, as directed 
by  the  Government.  Defence  is  also  able  to  assist  the  civil  community  in 
Australia during emergency situations, in a supporting role to state emergency 
services authorities, utilising  its available capabilities. At the government and 
community  levels,  the provision of DACC can be highly visible and result  in 
favourable  media  coverage.  This  can  lead  to  further  requests  and  greater 
expectations  for Defence support, potentially stretching available capabilities. 
To  address  this  set  of  issues, Defence’s DACC Manual  includes  clear policy 
and  guidance,  which  informs  Defence  decision  makers  about  the 
circumstances and  limitations applying  to  the acceptance of DACC  requests. 
Defence has also actively engaged with emergency assistance stakeholders  to 
build  understanding  of Defence’s  supporting  role  and  capability  to  provide 
emergency assistance. 
20. Defence has established different emergency DACC management and 
administrative  requirements according  to  three  ‘categories’ or  types of  tasks. 
The  emergency DACC  categories  enable  local Defence  commanders  to make 
on‐the‐ground  decisions  and  apply  base  resources  in  response  to  localised 
emergencies  (category  1);  and  provide  for  higher  level  Defence  decision 
making  and  coordination  in  response  to  more  extensive  or  large‐scale 
emergency  situations  (category  2  and  3).  The  categorisation  of  emergency 
                                                     
15  The audit report also suggests that Defence clarify cost recovery policy for emergency DACC 
category 3 ‘recovery’ tasks, and centrally review the content of regional DACC plans on an annual 
basis. These suggestions are discussed in the key findings at paragraphs 21 and 24. 
Summary 
 
ANAO Audit Report No.24 2013–14 





DACC  tasks  that do not  fit a  category definition neatly. Defence  revised  the 
category definitions when it released the DACC Manual in December 2012, to 
provide additional flexibility in categorising tasks. 
21. COMDISPLAN  advises  that  cost  recovery  may  be  sought  by  the 
Australian Government for emergency assistance tasks which are not directly 
related  to  the  safety of  life or property, or  that  could be handled within  the 
resources  of  the  state  government.  This  policy  encourages  self‐sufficiency 
within state governments for the management of emergencies, and discourages 
reliance on the Australian Government after the immediate threat has passed. 
The DACC Manual goes  further  in requiring  that cost recovery be sought  for 
all DACC  category  3  tasks  (recovery  tasks which  are  not directly  related  to 
saving life or property), or that a cost ‘waiver’ be approved in limited ‘special 
circumstances’. However, Defence  has  not  consistently  recovered  or waived 
costs  for  category 3  tasks  in accordance with  the  requirements of  the DACC 
Manual,  reflecting  a generally  immature  approach  to  emergency DACC  cost 
recovery.  Further,  Defence  has  advised  that  it  plans  to  amend  the  DACC 
Manual  to  indicate  that  costs  are  ‘generally  not  recovered  unless  the 
government  recipient  agrees  to  pay  costs’.  If  revised  along  these  lines,  the 
DACC  Manual  will  not  provide  clear  policy  and  guidance  on  the 
circumstances  in which cost recovery  is warranted. The ANAO suggests that, 
in  consultation  with  the  Government,  Defence  review  and  clarify  its  cost 
recovery policy  for  emergency DACC. As part of  the  review, Defence  could 
also  develop  thresholds  for  the  application  of  cost  recovery  to  category  3 
‘recovery’  tasks,  in  terms  of  the  estimated  value  and  type  of  assistance 
provided. Another  option  available  to Defence  is  to develop memoranda  of 
understanding with  individual  states which  formalise  the  reimbursement  of 
costs  when  Defence  undertakes  relevant  emergency  recovery  activities.  For 
example, there is a memorandum of understanding covering aircraft refuelling 
in Western Australia during firefighting activities.  
22. The Work Health and Safety Act 2011  (WHS Act) establishes a  range of 




requires  that  Defence  only  provide  emergency  DACC  support  when  its 
personnel are appropriately prepared or  trained,  thus minimising  the  risk of 
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Act.  The  DACC  Manual  also  mandates  documentation  of  formal  risk 
assessments  for  DACC  tasks,  but  this  does  not  occur  in  practice.  Defence 
informed the ANAO that in preparing personnel for emergency DACC tasks, it 
instead  relies  on  existing  approaches  to  skills  development,  as  well  as 
procedural  documentation  related  to  specific  activities  undertaken  by  ADF 
personnel, and the transferability of ADF skills and procedures to DACC tasks. 
In  light of  the variation between  the DACC Manual  requirement  and  actual 
practice,  there  would  be  benefit  in  Defence  reviewing  the  requirement  for 
formal  risk  assessments  for  all DACC  tasks,  and  clearly documenting  in  the 
DACC  Manual  the  measures  it  considers  necessary  to  meet  its  obligations 
under  the WHS Act when providing emergency DACC. This would  increase 
assurance  on  the  approach  adopted,  reinforce  individual  roles  and 
responsibilities, and provide a firmer basis for monitoring compliance with the 
WHS Act. 
Strategies to support operational effectiveness (Chapter 3) 
23. A range of Defence office holders, Groups and Services are involved in 
the  administration,  coordination  and  delivery  of  emergency  DACC.  Their 
respective  roles and  responsibilities are clearly set out  in  the DACC Manual. 
The  effective  delivery  of  emergency  DACC  depends  on  the  quality  of 
communication  and  coordination  between  the  various  areas  of  Defence 
involved. 
24. A  set  of  operational  plans  provides  Defence  with  guidance  on  its 
emergency  responses.  They  include  an  overarching  national  plan,  which 
provides  standardised  guidance  and  is  supported  by  regional DACC  plans. 
The  most  significant  feature  of  these  plans  is  that  they  move  beyond  the 
mainly  administrative  guidance  in  the  DACC  Manual  to  operational 
considerations, such as execution arrangements and phases, and the roles and 
responsibilities  of  various  emergency  management  organisations  across 
Australia. While most  of  these  plans  had  recently  been  updated, many  still 
contained  references  to  out‐of‐date  material,  such  as  old  versions  of 
COMDISPLAN and Defence’s overarching national plan  (Charlemagne). This 
highlights scope  for better communication within, and between,  the different 
areas  of  Defence  involved  in  emergency  DACC  about  agreed  policies, 
procedures  and  delivery  approaches.  The  ANAO  suggests  that  Defence 
centrally review the content of regional DACC plans on an annual basis. This 
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ANAO Audit Report No.24 2013–14 





25. Each  regional  Joint  Operations  Support  Staff  (JOSS)  office  has 
appointed  Defence  liaison  officers  to  engage  with  emergency  management 
authorities in the area. The ANAO noted evidence of regular contact between 
relevant  Defence  personnel  and  state  and  regional  emergency  management 
authorities, with  regional  JOSS  representatives  participating  in  various  state 
emergency  management  planning  activities.  State  emergency  management 
authorities  informed  the  ANAO  that  this  resulted  in  greater  awareness  of 
Defence’s  capability and more effects based16  requests  for Defence assistance 
from state and regional groups. 
26. In addition to the planning and preparatory liaison conducted by JOSS 
in  each  state,  JOSS  coordinate  the provision of Defence  assistance during an 
emergency  through  liaison  officers  embedded  with  the  state  emergency 
services  authority  coordinating  the  response.  These  liaison  officers  help 
communicate  and  coordinate  requests  for  Defence  assistance  so  that  the 
affected  jurisdiction  is  aware  of  the  available  capabilities,  limitations  and 
expected  timeframes  for  the  provision  of  emergency  DACC.  They  can  also 
provide  feedback  to Defence about a  jurisdiction’s capabilities, and  the  likely 
need for Defence assistance, which assists Defence to prepare for and respond 
to  requests  for  assistance. Nevertheless, EMA,  the Directorate  of Operations 




intends  to  document  liaison  officer  roles  and  responsibilities  during  JTF 
operations  in  the next version of  the DACC Manual, which  is  scheduled  for 
release in mid‐2014. 
 Recording and reporting emergency assistance (Chapter 4) 
27. The  Instruction  of  2004  and  the  DACC  Manual  of  2012  imposed 
extensive  reporting  requirements  for  individual  DACC  tasks.  With  few 
exceptions  these  requirements  have  not  been  met  by  responsible  areas  of 
                                                     
16  According to COMDISPLAN 2013, the most effective method of seeking assistance from Defence is to 
define or outline the outcome or result required (the effect to be achieved) rather than to seek 
provision of a specific capability. Defence is then able to consider the usefulness of a broader range of 
its available capabilities to achieve the required effect. 
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Defence  on  a  consistent  basis.  This  raises  questions  for  Defence  about  the 
balance between the benefits for DACC planning and public accountability of 
capturing  more  comprehensive  information,  and  the  risks  in  not  capturing 
certain  task  information.  Against  this  background,  Defence  should  review 
reporting  requirements  to  ensure  they  represent  the  minimum  information 
necessary to: identify the nature and cost of emergency DACC tasks, undertake 
any  cost  recovery,  discharge  accountability  obligations, maintain  reasonable 
records  for  future  use  and  learn  from  emergency  DACC  activities.  Defence 
should  also  take  steps  to  strengthen  the  priority  afforded  by  Defence 









constitute  additional  expenditure.  Nevertheless,  Defence  does  not  have  an 
understanding  of  the  overall  costs  of  its DACC  activities  because  it  has  not 
captured accurate costing data  for DACC activities undertaken.  In a resource 
constrained  environment,  a  better  understanding  of  the  cost  drivers  and 
complete costs of emergency DACC over time would assist Defence to pursue 
efficiencies  in  delivery  approaches.  Defence  should  also  keep  in  view  the 
opportunity cost associated with the  time spent by Defence commanders and 
personnel preparing for and undertaking emergency DACC tasks.  




30. Defence  does  not  have  a  set  of  objective  performance  measures  to 
assess  the  efficiency  and  effectiveness  of  emergency  DACC,  reflecting  the 
emergent nature of activities. To identify lessons, the DACC Manual states that 
Defence  Groups  and  ADF  Services  may  require  individual  units  providing 
                                                     
17  ANAO Audit Report, No.41, 1999–2000, Commonwealth Emergency Management Arrangements, 
p. 24. 
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capturing  more  comprehensive  information,  and  the  risks  in  not  capturing 
certain  task  information.  Against  this  background,  Defence  should  review 
reporting  requirements  to  ensure  they  represent  the  minimum  information 
necessary to: identify the nature and cost of emergency DACC tasks, undertake 
any  cost  recovery,  discharge  accountability  obligations, maintain  reasonable 
records  for  future  use  and  learn  from  emergency  DACC  activities.  Defence 
should  also  take  steps  to  strengthen  the  priority  afforded  by  Defence 









constitute  additional  expenditure.  Nevertheless,  Defence  does  not  have  an 
understanding  of  the  overall  costs  of  its DACC  activities  because  it  has  not 
captured accurate costing data  for DACC activities undertaken.  In a resource 
constrained  environment,  a  better  understanding  of  the  cost  drivers  and 
complete costs of emergency DACC over time would assist Defence to pursue 
efficiencies  in  delivery  approaches.  Defence  should  also  keep  in  view  the 
opportunity cost associated with the  time spent by Defence commanders and 
personnel preparing for and undertaking emergency DACC tasks.  




30. Defence  does  not  have  a  set  of  objective  performance  measures  to 
assess  the  efficiency  and  effectiveness  of  emergency  DACC,  reflecting  the 
emergent nature of activities. To identify lessons, the DACC Manual states that 
Defence  Groups  and  ADF  Services  may  require  individual  units  providing 
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DACC  support  to prepare  a Post Activity Report  at  their discretion  and  for 
their  own  use,  and  that Headquarters  Joint Operations Command  (HQJOC) 
may seek a Post Activity Report  for DACC operations. Post Activity Reports 
(or  equivalent)  were  generally  completed  following  the  larger  emergency 
DACC responses but not for smaller scale tasks. In addition, HQJOC has run a 
Lessons  Board  following  the  end  of  the  annual  disaster  season,  which 
considers  analysis  of  key  themes  arising  from  Post  Activity  Reports,  and 
recommends improvements to DACC procedures and activities. As previously 




improvement  actions  have  been  long‐term  issues  for  Defence.  The 
implementation  of  a Defence–wide management  system  for  lessons  learned, 
due for initial implementation in mid‐2014, is an important step in creating an 
integrated  approach  to  the  management  of  lessons  learned  from  Defence 
operations. 
Summary of agency response 






responding  to  natural  disasters  in  Australia,  in  particular  the  value  of  the 
support  provided  to  the Australian  community  by Defence during  times  of 
crisis and that Defence’s emergency DACC procedures are generally effective. 
Defence  acknowledges  the  findings  contained  in  the  audit  report  and 
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reported  for  each  emergency  DACC  task  to 
discharge  accountability  obligations,  identify 
costs,  undertake  cost  recovery  where 
appropriate, maintain records for future use and 
learn from emergency DACC activities; and  
 take steps  to strengthen  the priority afforded by 
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flood  or  cyclone,  or  result  from  human  activities.18  Emergencies  occur 
frequently  in  Australia  and  range  in  severity  from  small‐scale  incidents  to 
large‐scale, catastrophic events. The human and economic cost of these events 
can  be  substantial.  For  example,  the  Black  Saturday  bushfires  in Victoria  in 
2009  claimed  the  lives  of  173  people,  affected  over  78  communities  and 
destroyed 2029 homes; and the insured cost for losses due to Cyclone Oswald 
in  2013 was  estimated  at  $1.1 billion  in Queensland  and New  South Wales, 
with $154 million  in State and Australian Government assistance provided  to 
those affected. 19  
1.2 A  well‐directed,  coordinated  and  timely  emergency  management 
response acts to minimise the impact of an emergency on the community and 
support  the  recovery  process.  When  a  natural  disaster  or  other  domestic 
emergency  occurs,  it  is  primarily  the  responsibility  of  the  relevant  state  or 
territory (state) government to protect life, property and the environment. State 
governments draw on a range of emergency services, volunteer organisations 
and  commercial  resources  when  responding  to  emergencies.  These  include 
state police, ambulance and fire brigades, the various State Emergency Services 
and  private  contractors.  State  governments  may  also  request  Australian 
Government  non‐financial  assistance  to  provide  additional  resources  for 
response and recovery activities.20  
                                                     
18  The terms ‘emergency’ and ‘disaster’ are used interchangeably by organisations involved in 
emergency/disaster response to describe events which require special arrangements to manage the 
situation. Criteria used to define ‘disaster’ can be found at Emergency Management Australia, Disaster 
Information, [Internet], EMA, available from <http://www.emknowledge.gov.au/disaster-information> 
[accessed 4 November 2013]. 
19  Emergency Management Australia, Knowledge Hub, [Internet], EMA, available from 
<http://www.emknowledge.gov.au/disaster-information> [accessed 28 January 2014]. 
20  Non-financial assistance can include, but is not limited to: planning, expertise, provision of mapping 
services, counseling, advice, management of external resources and physical assistance. Emergency 
Management Australia, Australian Government Disaster Response Plan (COMDISPLAN), 2013, p. 5. 
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Australian Government and Defence emergency 
assistance arrangements 
1.3 The Attorney‐General’s Department, through Emergency Management 
Australia  (EMA),  develops  and  maintains  the  Australian  Government’s 
emergency  management  policy  and  plans.  The  Australian  Government 
Disaster Response Plan is known as COMDISPLAN. This plan outlines request 
and  coordination  arrangements  for  providing  Australian  Government 
emergency assistance, in the event of an emergency in Australia or its offshore 
territories. One of the guiding principles of COMDISPLAN is that:  
Before  a  request  is  made  under  COMDISPLAN  a  jurisdiction  must  have 
exhausted all government, community and commercial options to provide that 
effect.21 
1.4 The arrangements established by COMDISPLAN apply  to  emergency 
Defence  Assistance  to  the  Civil  Community  (DACC).  The  provision  of 
emergency DACC is also governed by Defence policy and procedures. Defence 
Instructions (General) OPS 05‐1: Defence Assistance to the Civil Community – policy 
and procedures  (the  Instruction) applied until December 2012. The  Instruction 
was  replaced  at  this  time  by  the  Defence  Assistance  to  the  Civil  Community 
Manual (DACC Manual), which states that: 
Emergency Defence Assistance  to  the Civil Community  (DACC)  is  support 
provided to the civil community where immediate action is necessary to save 
human life or alleviate suffering, prevent extensive loss of animal life, prevent 
widespread  loss/damage  to  property  or  to  prevent  environmental  damage, 
and  when  State/Territory  resources  are  inadequate.  It  also  encompasses 
assistance associated with the recovery from an emergency or disaster.22 
1.5 The  DACC  Manual  recognises  two  types  of  DACC:  emergency  and 
non‐emergency. Emergency DACC  is divided  into  three categories according 
to the type and duration of assistance: local emergency assistance (category 1); 




21  Emergency Management Australia, Australian Government Disaster Response Plan (COMDISPLAN), 
2013, p. 6.  
22  Department of Defence, Defence Assistance to the Civil Community Manual, 2012, paragraph 3.1. 
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21  Emergency Management Australia, Australian Government Disaster Response Plan (COMDISPLAN), 
2013, p. 6.  
22  Department of Defence, Defence Assistance to the Civil Community Manual, 2012, paragraph 3.1. 
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emergency,  Australian  Government  resources  may  be  deployed  in 
support  of  state  authorities  for  limited  periods  without  the  need  to 
activate  COMDISPLAN.23  In  this  situation,  regional,  district  or  local 
emergency  management  authorities  may  request  assistance  directly 
from  an Australian Defence  Force  (ADF)  unit  located  in  the  affected 
area.  Local ADF  commanders  decide whether  to  undertake  the  task, 
taking  into  account  available  resources  and  priorities.  This  type  of 
assistance is classified as DACC category 1. 
 For  more  extensive  or  ongoing  emergency  situations,  or  assistance 
associated with  recovery  from  a  civil  emergency or disaster,  requests 
for  Australian  Government  assistance  must  be  approved  and 
coordinated through EMA, under  the guidance of COMDISPLAN. On 





1.6 Figure  1.1  shows  the process used  to  request  and provide Australian 
Government  emergency  assistance,  through  EMA.  EMA  informed  the 




23  Emergency Management Australia, Australian Government Disaster Response Plan (COMDISPLAN), 
2013, p. 6. 
24  EMA informed the ANAO that 80 per cent is an overall average which can vary greatly depending on 
the disaster. For example, some emergencies will see more, or less, requests for assistance tasked to 
Defence, dependent on the type of disaster and the assistance required.  
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Figure 1.1: Request and provision of Australian Government 
non-financial assistance under COMDISPLAN 
 
Source: ANAO summary of EMA, Australian Government Disaster Response Plan (COMDISPLAN), 2013, 
p. 9. 
Emergency Defence Assistance to the Civil Community 
(DACC) 
1.7 Defence  support  to  state  emergency  management  authorities  during 
domestic  disaster  relief  has  been  recognised  in  successive  Defence  White 
Papers  and  is  a  regular  feature of Defence  activity. The  2009 Defence White 
Paper  stated  that  the  ‘most  basic  strategic  interest  remains  the  defence  of 
Australia  against  direct  armed  attack’.  However,  it  also  acknowledged  that 
Defence  has  ‘significant  capabilities  that  can  be  used  to  support  ...  disaster 
recovery’  and  that Defence’s  ‘vital  role  in  supporting domestic  security  and 
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emergency  response efforts will continue.’25 This approach was  reaffirmed  in 
the  2013  Defence  White  Paper,  which  discussed  the  need  for  Defence  to 
provide  capabilities  in  support  of  disaster  response  and  acknowledged 
Defence’s  significant  contribution  to  the  emergency  responses  to  extreme 
weather events in Australia.26 
1.8 The  benefits  of  utilising Defence  in  support  of  emergency  responses 
include that Defence is often able to deploy ADF personnel (including Reserve 
personnel) with relevant expertise and skills (for example, engineers), as well 
as  useful  equipment  (from  transport  aircraft  to  water  purification  units). 
Defence may also have the capacity to deploy its personnel and equipment at 
relatively  short  notice due  to  the  geographical proximity  of  certain  bases  to 
incident  areas  and  its  access  to  transport  assets.  Further,  Defence  has 
developed  approaches  to  the  planning,  coordination  and  conduct  of 
operations, which may be readily adapted to emergency responses.  
1.9 Examples  of  the  emergency  assistance  provided  by Defence  include: 
airlift of equipment and personnel; engineering support; search and support; 
temporary  accommodation  and  general  support;  health  and  psychological 
support; aviation refuelling; and communications.  








1.11 DACC  forms  part  of  Defence’s  Outcome  3  in  the  Portfolio  Budget 
Statements  for  the  Defence  Portfolio.  In  the  2013–14  Portfolio  Budget 
                                                     
25  Department of Defence, Defence White Paper 2009: Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific century: 
Force 2030, pp. 12 and 24.  
26  Department of Defence, Defence White Paper 2013, p. 30. 
27  Rapid Impact Assessment involves the collection, analysis and distribution of information on people, 
property and environment affected by an emergency event. Rapid Impact Assessment is defined in 
The Australian Emergency Management Handbook Series, Community Recovery Handbook 2, p. 162, 
[Internet], EMA, available from 
<http://www.em.gov.au/Publications/Australianemergencymanualseries/Pages/default.aspx#AEMH>, 
[accessed 17 October 2013].  
  
ANAO Audit Report No.24 2013–14 




and  civilian  authorities  as  requested  by Government’.28 Outcome  3  includes 
emergency  assistance,  search  and  rescue,  disaster  recovery,  surveillance, 
security  and  law  enforcement  roles. Emergency DACC  costs  are not  funded 






Figure 1.2:  Number of emergency DACC tasks recorded by Defence, by 
DACC category, 2005–06 to 2012–13 
 
Source: ANAO analysis of Defence data.  
Notes:  Data for 2005–06 to 2007–08 was derived from Defence Annual Reports. From 2008–09, Defence 
stopped reporting the number of DACC tasks in its Annual Report (see Table 4.1). 
Defence provided the ANAO with DACC registers for the period 2008–09 to 2012–13. However, 
some regional registers were incomplete, particularly for 2008–09 and 2009–10. Therefore, this 
graph represents the number of emergency DACC tasks recorded. The actual number of tasks 
completed by Defence is higher.  
                                                     
28  Commonwealth of Australia, Portfolio Budget Statements 2013–14: Budget Related Paper No.1.4A, 
Defence Portfolio, p. 79, [Internet], Defence, available from 
<http://www.defence.gov.au/budget/13-14/pbs/2013-2014_Defence_PBS_Complete.pdf> [accessed 
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External reports on emergency DACC  
1.13 Defence  involvement  in  natural  disasters  can  attract  considerable 
publicity  and  community  interest.  It  has  also  been  the  subject  of  several 
strategic  studies. The Australian Strategic Policy  Institute has published  four 




 continual  reduction  per  capita  in  the  number  of  emergency  services 
personnel and volunteers;  
 growing community and political expectations  that military  resources 
will be used to support whole‐of‐government efforts; and 
 larger  and  more  frequent  extreme  weather  events  due  to  climate 
change.30 
Related audits 
1.14 Previous  ANAO  performance  audit  reports  relating  to  domestic 
emergency response include: 
 No.8, 2013–14,  Australian  Government  Reconstruction  Inspectorate’s 
Conduct of Value for Money Reviews of Flood Reconstruction Projects 
in Queensland; 
 No.24, 2012–13, The Preparation  and Delivery of  the Natural Disaster 
Recovery Work Plans for Queensland and Victoria; 
                                                     
29  A Yates and A Bergin, Hardening Australia: Climate change and national disaster resilience, 
Australian Strategic Policy Institute Special Report, Issue 24, August 2009; A Yates and A Bergin, 
Here to help: Strengthening the Defence role in Australian disaster management, Australian Strategic 
Policy Institute Special Report, Issue 28, February 2010; A Yates and A Bergin, More than good 
deeds: Disaster risk management and Australian, Japanese and US Defence forces, Australian 
Strategic Policy Institute Special Report, Issue 43, December 2011; and A Press, A Bergin and 
E Garnsey, Heavy Weather: Climate and the Australian Defence Force, Australian Strategic Policy 
Institute Special Report, Issue 49, March 2013.  
30  There is an active debate on the effects of climate change. For example, the Prime Minister, the 
Honourable Tony Abbott MP, commented on 23 October 2013, in respect to the October 2013 New 
South Wales bushfires that ‘these fires are certainly not a function of climate change, they’re a function 
of life in Australia.’ Sydney Morning Herald, [Internet] available from: 
http://www.smh.com.au/environment/climate-change/un-official-talking-out-of-her-hat-on-bushfires-and
-climate-change-says-tony-abbott-20131023-2w0mq.html [accessed 11 November 2013]. 
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 No.23, 2012–13,  The  Australian  Government  Reconstruction 
Inspectorate’s  Conduct  of  Value  for  Money  Reviews  of  Flood 
Reconstruction Projects in Victoria; 
 No.1, 2011–12,  The  Australian  Defence  Force’s  Mechanisms  for 
Learning from Operational Activities; 
 No.36, 2009–10,  Emergency  Management  and  Community  Recovery 
Assistance in Centrelink; 
 No.27, 2007–08, Emergency Management Australia; and 
 No.41, 1999–2000,  Commonwealth  Emergency  Management 
Arrangements. 
1.15 The  1999–2000  performance  audit  on  Commonwealth  emergency 
management arrangements found that Defence was not quantifying the cost of 













Civil  Community  –  Policy, Approvals,  Processes  – Audit  Task  09/006.  The  internal 




31  ANAO Audit Report, No.41, 1999–2000, Commonwealth Emergency Management Arrangements, 
p. 24. 
32  The application of lessons learned during DACC operations is discussed in Chapter 4 of this report. 
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31  ANAO Audit Report, No.41, 1999–2000, Commonwealth Emergency Management Arrangements, 
p. 24. 
32  The application of lessons learned during DACC operations is discussed in Chapter 4 of this report. 
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Audit objective, criteria and scope 
1.18 The  audit  objective  was  to  assess  the  administrative  effectiveness  of 
Defence’s procedures to provide emergency assistance to the civil community. 
1.19 Four  high‐level  criteria  were  developed  to  assist  in  evaluating 
Defence’s performance in terms of the audit objective: 




with  other  agencies  to  provide  emergency  assistance,  including with 
state emergency management authorities; and 
 Defence  divisions  with  responsibility  for  emergency  assistance  are 









other documents pertaining  to  the provision  of  emergency  assistance 
by Defence; 




1.22 The  audit  was  conducted  in  accordance  with  the  ANAO’s  auditing 
standards, at a cost to the ANAO of approximately $528 000.  
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Table 1.1:  Report structure 
Chapter 2—Defence 
emergency assistance 
framework (includes case 
study 1) 
Examines Defence’s emergency assistance policy and 
procedures. It also examines Defence’s approach to meeting 
its obligations under work, health and safety legislation when 
providing emergency assistance. 
Chapter 3—Strategies to 
support operational 
effectiveness (includes 
case study 2) 
Examines Defence’s emergency management structure and 
planning; and the relationships between Defence and 
emergency management authorities. 
Chapter 4—Recording 
and reporting emergency 
assistance (includes case 
study 3) 
Examines Defence’s records of emergency assistance tasks, 
external reporting on emergency assistance, and operational 
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2. Defence Emergency Assistance 
Framework 




2.1 State  emergency  management  authorities  have  overall  responsibility 
for planning and managing  responses  to emergencies  in  their  jurisdiction.  In 







 emergency  DACC  policy,  including  the  related  issue  of  managing 
stakeholder expectations for the provision of assistance; 




Wales  in  January 2013,  focusing on  categorisation of  the  task and  the 
recovery of costs (case study 1); and 
 approach  to  meeting  work,  health  and  safety  obligations  when 
providing emergency DACC. 




Australian  Government.  Defence  has  also  expressed  its  commitment  to 
assisting  the  civil  community  within  Australia  in  both  emergency  and 
non‐emergency situations. The provision of DACC is therefore a balancing act, 
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2.4 The DACC Manual  includes appropriate high‐level guidance  to assist 
ADF  commanders  considering whether  to  provide DACC,  in  the  form  of  a 
policy statement and general principles. The general principles include that: 
 DACC  provides  the  means  through  which  Defence  can  assist  other 







2.5 The  general  principles  identify  the  DACC  Manual  as  a  source  of 
guidance  in  the  application  of  Defence  resources  to  tasks  outside  of  core 
military operations. They also emphasise that DACC support must not involve 
the use, or potential use, of force by Defence members.  
Steps taken by Defence to manage expectations 
2.6 Expectations  management  is  a  practical  challenge  for  Defence,  as 
DACC  is  not  its  primary  mission,  but  is  nonetheless  a  highly  valued  and 
prominent element of  its activities. Clarity of understanding can  facilitate  the 




appearing  to be more prominent  than was actually  the case.34 For example, a 
report that was issued following the 2011 Victorian floods observed that many 
members of  the community had an expectation  that  ‘anyone  in uniform was 
                                                     
33  Department of Defence, Defence Assistance to the Civil Community Manual, 2012, paragraphs  
2.2–2.6. 
34  Media coverage during emergencies often highlights Defence’s contribution to response and recovery 
operations. See for example: The Courier Mail, Teams of soldiers bolster NQ clean-up in wake of 
Cyclone Yasi, 7 February 2011; The Daily Telegraph, NSW hit with floods on Queensland Cyclone 
Yasi’s anniversary, 3 February 2012; The Daily Telegraph, Australian soldiers brave flood waters, 
15 January 2011; The Australian, Army called in as flooded towns brace for more, 3 March 2012. 
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of  Defence  involved  in  emergency  DACC,  Joint  Operations  Support  Staff 
(JOSS) and Military Strategic Commitments (MSC), have reported that there is 
an  expectation  within  the  community  that  when  Defence  supports  the 
emergency response to a bushfire, Defence personnel will be fighting the fires. 
In  fact,  the  most  common  and  effective  use  of  Defence  resources  during  a 





a  perennial  challenge.  Defence  involvement  in  responding  to  domestic 
emergencies provides both political capital  that governments at all  levels are 
keen  to exploit, but also provides kudos  to  the ADF. Defence will always be 
sensitive to requests for Defence support which would otherwise be delivered 
by  commercial  entities.  Defence  does  not  welcome  situations  in  which  it 
appears to be usurping public commercial opportunities. 
2.9 Defence  has  informed  stakeholders  that  its  ability  to  respond  to 
requests  for  emergency  assistance  depends  on  its  other  priorities  and  the 
availability of relevant capabilities. In 2013, Defence informed the Minister for 
Defence that: 
Defence  support  is  limited  to  that  which  can  be  accomplished  within  the 
standing  core  qualifications,  skills  and  resources  of  Defence.  Defence  is 
structured,  equipped  and  trained  for  the  defence  of  Australia,  not  for 
Australia’s civil defence. The best role that Defence can perform in supporting 
the civil authorities ... is to respond to requests for support.36 
2.10 Defence  has  engaged  with  external  stakeholders  through  a  range  of 
mechanisms  to  inform  them  about Defence’s  role  and  capability  to  provide 
emergency assistance. These mechanisms have included whole‐of‐government 
briefings,  ongoing  relationships  between  Defence  personnel  and  state 
emergency management  authorities,  representation  in  the various  state‐level 
                                                     
35  N Comrie, Review of the 2010-11 Flood Warnings and Response, 1 December 2011, p. 186, 
[Internet], available from <http://www.floodsreview.vic.gov.au/images/stories/documents/review_ 
20101011_flood_warnings_and_response.pdf> [accessed 4 July 2013]. 
36  Department of Defence, Ministerial Representation Smith/MC13-000103, Defence support, including 
use of aircraft, to fight bushfires, secure Defence bases and detention centres, 5 March 2013. 
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emergency  management  groups,  and  actively  participating  as  part  of  state 
emergency management centres during an emergency.37 
Emergency DACC procedures 
2.11 The  DACC  Manual  uses  a  task  categorisation  system  to  define 
Defence’s framework and procedures for the management and administration 
of DACC. Of  the six DACC categories described  in  the DACC Manual,  three 
are specific to emergency DACC and are described in Table 2.1.38  
Table 2.1: Emergency DACC categories 
Category  Emergency characteristics Standard process 
1  Localised emergency assistance 
where immediate action is 
necessary to save human life, 
alleviate suffering, prevent 
extensive loss of animal life or 
widespread loss or damage to 
property.  
 Examples include sandbagging, 
provision of temporary 
accommodation and 
transportation. 
 Approval Authority: Senior 
Australian Defence Force Officer 
(SADFO)/Unit Commander.  
 Assistance is provided by SADFO or 
Unit Commander. 
 Manpower and equipment are drawn 
from within the Defence unit’s own 
resources. 
 Provision of assistance is short-term 
(should not normally exceed 48 hours). 
 Recipient does not require indemnity or 
insurance. 
 No cost recovery is available. 
                                                     
37  State emergency management centres operate during an emergency to coordinate emergency 
responses. They are referred to differently in each State. For example, (ACT) Emergency Coordination 
Centre, (NSW) State Emergency Operations Centre, and (QLD) State Disaster Coordination Centre. 
38  Categories 4, 5 and 6 relate to non-emergency DACC activities such as support for public events of 
significance or use of Defence facilities, and are not part of the scope of this audit. 
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Category  Emergency characteristics Standard process 
2  Significant emergency assistance 
beyond that provided under 
category 1, during a more 
extensive or continuing disaster, 
directly related to saving human 
life, alleviating human suffering or 
preventing the loss of, or damage 
to property when state resources 
are inadequate.  
 Examples include significant aerial 
transportation, rescue operations 
and medical evacuations. 
 Approval Authority: Minister for 
Defence/Chief of the Defence 
Force (CDF). 
 State emergency management 
authorities request assistance through 
Emergency Management Australia 
(EMA). 
 Australian Government Disaster 
Response Plan (COMDISPLAN) 
activated. 
 Defence activities coordinated by 
Headquarters Joint Operations 
Command (HQJOC). 
 A Joint Task Force (JTF) may be 
established. 
 Recipient does not require indemnity or 
insurance. 
 No cost recovery is available. 
3  Assistance associated with 
recovery from a civil emergency or 
disaster, not directly related to the 
saving of human life or property. 
 Examples include provision of 
temporary bridging, road 
restoration and clean-up 
operations. 
 Approval Authority: Minister for 
Defence/CDF. 
 State emergency management 
authorities request assistance through 
EMA. 
 COMDISPLAN activated. 
 Defence activities coordinated by 
HQJOC. A JTF may be established. 
 Indemnity and insurance requirements 
must be met for non-government 
entities requesting assistance.  
 Cost recovery is available, although a 
waiver may be sought through 
appropriate Defence channels. 
Source: ANAO summary of guidance in the Defence Assistance to the Civil Community Manual, 2012. 
2.12 Defence informed the ANAO that the categorisation system allows for 
an appropriate ADF  response  to an escalating  situation or  crisis, particularly 
where  there  is  a  threat  to  life. Defence  also  noted  that  the  categorisation  of 
tasks enables decisions on the acceptance of tasks to be made at an appropriate 
level.  Decision  making  is  to  take  account  of  the  level  of  resources  being 
committed and the potential sensitivities associated with Defence undertaking 
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Figure 2.1:  Arrangements for the request and provision of emergency 
DACC 
Source: ANAO analysis.  
DACC category 1 response 
2.13 The  initial response  to a  localised emergency, or an event  involving a 
limited time period, will usually result in a DACC category 1 task. These initial 
requests  for Defence  support  are made directly  by district,  regional  or  local 
emergency  management  authorities  to  a  Senior  Australian  Defence  Force 
Officer (SADFO), Unit Commander or regional JOSS. Category 1 responses are 
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managed  by  the  SADFO  or Unit Commander  in  consultation with  the  local 
jurisdiction,  often  without  external  involvement  from  the  wider  Defence 




crisis,  within  the  immediate  resources  available  to  the  SADFO  or  Unit 
Commander. This  support  is generally  short‐term  in nature  and  confined  to 
the vicinity of the incident. 
DACC category 2 and 3 response 
2.15 An  emergency  may  escalate  into  a  more  extensive,  or  large‐scale, 
situation  which  necessitates  a  broader  response  managed  by  the  state 
government.  In  this  situation,  requests  for Australian Government assistance 
are made by  state  emergency management authorities  through EMA, within 
the framework of COMDISPLAN. Requests accepted by Defence will result in 
a DACC category 2 or 3 response. Defence liaison officers will be posted to the 




and  manage  the  Defence  response  when  COMDISPLAN  is  activated  and 
Defence has agreed to provide a category 2 or category 3 level of support. This 
may involve the establishment of a Joint Task Force (JTF). A JTF is defined as ‘a 
force  composed  of  assigned  or  attached  elements  of  two  or  more  Services 
established for the purpose of carrying out a specific task or mission’.39 
Clarity of emergency DACC categories 
2.17 The  categorisation  of  emergency  DACC  tasks  is  not  always 
straightforward  or  clear.  For  example,  the  Post  Activity  Report40  for  the 
February 2011 Victorian floods observed that: 
                                                     
39  Department of Defence, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 3.14, 2 February 2009, p. 6, 
[Internet], Defence, available from <http://www.defence.gov.au/foi/docs/disclosures/021_1112_ 
Document_ADDP_3_14_Targeting.pdf> [accessed 18 July 2013]. 
40  Post Activity Reports and Post Operation Reports provide details of the operation, and the lessons 
learned. These reports are discussed further in Chapter 4. 
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is also an uncertainty  in  the approval processes  for Defence DACC  support. 
There  was  some  disjoint  between  DACC  categories  and  tasking  and  the 
application  of  current  policy;  an  example  being …  enduring DACC  1  tasks 
beyond the 24 [hour] period41 and without the life/property threshold. Whilst 
not  significant,  this  did  create  uncertainty  in  the mind  of  SES  and  EMA  in 
terms of what ADF can delivery and by when.42,43 
2.18 To address  these  issues,  the DACC Manual,  released on 19 December 
2012,  contained  some  amendments  to  the  DACC  category  definitions.  Of 
particular note: 
 category  1 was  amended  to  include  a  provision  for  the  transition  to 
category 2 or 3 ‘upon review’ of a completed task;  
 category  2  was  expanded  to  include  ‘short‐term  recovery  activities’; 
and 
 examples  of  the  types  of  tasks  associated  with  each  category  were 
included. 
2.19 The changes made  to  the DACC Manual provide additional  flexibility 
in  categorising  tasks.  The  addition  of  short‐term  recovery  activities  into  the 
definition of DACC category 2 was undertaken to allow more flexibility for the 
ADF  to help with  tasks  on‐the‐ground, where  a  threat  is  still  active  but not 
necessarily imminent. 
Cost recovery 
2.20 The  Australian  Government’s  cost  recovery  policy  is  set  out  in  the 
Australian  Government  Cost  Recovery  Guidelines.  The  Guidelines  state  that 
‘agencies  should  set  charges  to  recover  all  the  costs  of  products  or  services 
where  it  is  efficient  to do  so’  and  that  cost  recovery  ‘should not  be  applied 
where it is not cost effective, where it is inconsistent with Government policy 
objectives,  or  where  it  would  unduly  stifle  competition  or  industry 
                                                     
41  The Instruction, which was valid in 2011, specified that category 1 tasks should not exceed 24 hours. 
42  Department of Defence, Australian Army, Headquarters 4th Brigade, Post Activity Report, Assistance 
to the Victorian Floods, 2011, p. 5. 
43  Case study 1 on page 50 provides another example of uncertainty in relation to the categorisation of a 
DACC task. 
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innovation.’ Further, agencies are  to  ‘ensure  that cost  recovery arrangements 
have clear legal authority for the imposition of charges.’44 
2.21 The Cost Recovery Guidelines  state  that  ‘many  arrangements  are not 
cost recovery for the purposes of the policy’, and that ‘exclusions include any 
form  of  intra‐agency  or  inter/intra‐governmental  charging’.  The  Guidelines 
subsequently advise that: 
Where Australian Government agencies have service level agreements or other 
cost  recovery  arrangements with  State/Territory Governments  or with  other 
Australian Government agencies, these guidelines should be complied with to 
the greatest possible extent, depending on other government requirements.45 
2.22 While  emergency  DACC  tasks  generally  involve  intergovernmental 




from  States  for  assistance  provided  under  COMDISPLAN.  However,  when 
Australian Government assistance is provided for tasks not directly related to 
the  safety  of  life  and  property  or  that  could  be  handled  by  jurisdiction 
resources  (e.g.  clean‐up  teams)  the  Australian  Government  may  seek 
reimbursement from the affected jurisdiction.46 
2.24 The DACC Manual goes  further and  instructs Defence  to  recover  the 
direct costs of category 3 tasks, or to seek approval for a cost waiver/variation 
from  the  Minister  for  Defence  or  the  CDF  for  those  tasks.  This  approach 
follows from the classification of category 3 tasks as recovery activities, which 
are not directly related  to  the saving of  life or property  (see Table 2.1). Costs 
can  only  be  waived  where  there  are  special  circumstances,  including  ‘tasks 
with significant public affairs, recruiting or training value to Defence or a task 
of  a  one‐off  nature  involving  only  a  minor  cost.’47  These  arrangements  are 
intended  to  encourage  the  application  of  existing  state  resources  to  the 
emergency management recovery activities for which they are responsible.  
                                                     
44  Department of Finance and Administration, Australian Government Cost Recovery Guidelines, 
July 2005, p. 2. 
45  ibid., pp. 10 and 11.  
46  Emergency Management Australia, Australian Government Disaster Response Plan (COMDISPLAN), 
2013, p. 12.  
47  Department of Defence, Defence Assistance to the Civil Community Manual, 2012, paragraph 6.25. 
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other  four category 3  tasks. Table 2.2 summarises waiver details  for  the eight 
category 3 tasks. 
Table 2.2: Approval of cost waivers for category 3 tasks 




















No  Yes  Minister for 
Defence 
Unknown 
South QLD:  
2011–12/1 





No  No - - 
South QLD:  
2012–13/017 
No  Yes  Minister for 
Defence 
$265 335 
South QLD:  
2012–13/018 
No  No - - 
South QLD:  
2012–13/021 
No  No - - 
Vic/Tas:  
2012/13-T/009 
No  Yes  Minister for 
Defence 
$258 245 








48  Annual DACC registers are prepared by regional JOSS and should include details of all DACC tasks 
undertaken in the area. Maintenance of the registers is discussed in Chapter 4. 
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limited, or  in most  instances, no cost recovery  is being pursued  for activities 
classified  within  categories  3,  4  and  6  for  which  cost  recovery  is  to  be 
undertaken ... unless a waiver is approved.49  
2.27 Based on these findings, Defence does not consistently recover or waive 




the  limited  approach  adopted  for  the  identification  of  recovery  tasks  and 
recovery  of  costs  for  these  tasks  (discussed  at paragraph  2.26),  indicate  that 
Defence’s  general  approach  to  emergency  DACC  cost  recovery  remains 
immature.  
2.28 Defence has advised  that  it will  include additional  information  in  the 
next  version  of  the  DACC  Manual  to  clarify  its  approach  to  cost  recovery. 
Defence proposed that it would include the following information:  
Costs associated with any form of support to Commonwealth, State/Territory 
or  Local  Government  are  generally  not  recovered  unless  the  Government 
recipient  agrees  to  pay  costs  prior  to  the  support  being  provided.  Cost 
recovery may not be warranted where  it  is not  cost  effective or  it would be 
inconsistent with government policy objectives. 
…  If  the  relevant  costs  are  associated  with  any  form  of  support  to 
Commonwealth,  State/Territory  or  Local  Government,  then  Defence  should 
consult with  the Government  recipient prior  to Defence agreeing  to provide 
the support, on whether the Government recipient can pay net additional costs 
associated with the support to be provided. 
2.29 These  statements  do  not  clarify  the  circumstances  in  which  cost 
recovery  is  warranted  and  Defence  personnel  are  obliged  to  pursue  the 
recovery  of  costs.  The  ANAO  suggests  that,  in  consultation  with  the 
Government, Defence review and clarify its cost recovery policy for emergency 
DACC. As part of  the  review, Defence could also develop  thresholds  for  the 
application  of  cost  recovery  to  category  3  ‘recovery’  tasks,  in  terms  of  the 
estimated value and  type of assistance provided. Another option available  to 
Defence  is  to  develop  memoranda  of  understanding  with  individual  states 
which formalise the reimbursement of costs when Defence undertakes relevant 
                                                     
49  Defence, Defence Assistance to the Civil community — Policy, Approvals, Processes — Audit Task 
09/0006, Final Audit Report, p. 7. 
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emergency  recovery  activities.  For  example,  there  is  a  memorandum  of 
understanding  covering  aircraft  refuelling  in  Western  Australia  during 
firefighting activities. 
2.30 The  following  case  study  focuses  on  the  categorisation  of  emergency 
DACC tasks and recovery of costs.  
Case Study 1: refuelling at HMAS Albatross—ongoing 
category 1 task with cost recovery 
2.31 As  indicated  in Table 2.1, category 1  tasks are usually short‐term  (less 
than  48  hours)  activities which  are  authorised  by  the  individual  SADFO  or 
Unit  Commander,  and  delivered  using  their  own  resources  without  cost 
recovery. In this example, an extended category 1 task was authorised by the 




Naval  Air  Station  at  Nowra  (HMAS  Albatross)  supply  fuel  and  provide 
refuelling services for civilian firefighting aircraft, including those operated by 
the NSWRFS.50 Headquarters  Joint Operations Command  (HQJOC)  informed 
the ANAO  that  in  its original  request  for  assistance,  the NSWRFS proposed 
that it reimburse the fuel costs. 
2.33 On 8 January 2013, Defence accepted the task request subject to full cost 
recovery  from  the New South Wales Government  for  the  fuel provided, and 
availability of qualified personnel. These conditions were accepted by the State 
Emergency  Operations  Centre.  The  CDF  then  released  the  following  Task 
Order (extracts):  
Defence is to provide refuelling services to civilian firefighting aircraft  ... as a 
DACC  1  activity.  SADFO  are  authorised  to  continue  this  DACC  1  activity 
beyond 48 hours.  
                                                     
50  The reason given for this request was, ‘the ability of the New South Wales Rural Fire Service to 
ensure the timely refueling of firefighting aircraft has been stretched to capacity’. Other resources 
requested at the time included accommodation for Rural Fire Service personnel.  
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SADFO  are  to  record  fuel provided  to  civilian  aircraft  for  reporting  in  final 
DACC  Post  Operation  Report.  This  information  will  be  used  to  seek  cost 
recovery for fuel used.51 
2.34 While this assistance was initially due to expire on 14 January 2013, the 
regional  JOSS  office  liaised  with  the  SADFO  at  HMAS  Albatross  to  check 
Defence’s  capability  to  continue  providing  support  if  an  extension  was 
requested. Ultimately, two extensions were approved by the SADFO at HMAS 
Albatross,  until  23  January  2013.  During  this  period  Defence  provided 
refuelling services to helicopters, sky cranes and fixed‐wing aircraft. 
DACC categorisation 
2.35 The  refuelling  activity  was  classified  as  category  1  as  it  was  a  local 
emergency directly related  to  the saving of  life and property  in a New South 
Wales region, and it was not associated with recovery efforts.  
2.36 The DACC Manual  defines  category  1  tasks  as  activities  that  do  not 
normally exceed 48 hours, and are not subject  to cost recovery. This  task did 
not  conform  to  the  general  category  1 definition  as  it  exceeded  the  48  hour 
timeframe  and was  subject  to  cost  recovery  action, which,  according  to  the 
DACC Manual,  is exclusive  to category 3  tasks. While this did not  impact on 




2.37 On  10  and  14  January  2013,  the Minister  for Defence was  incorrectly 
advised that ‘Defence will absorb all of the costs attributed to DACC category 1 
local  emergency  assistance’  for  the  refuelling  activity,  even  though  the  task 
order  was  clear  that  cost  recovery  would  be  applied  (see  paragraph  2.33). 
Defence did not provide  any  further  advice  to  the Minister  that  the original 
advice  was  incorrect  and  that  the  costs  were  actually  recovered.  On 





51  Department of Defence, Chief of the Defence Force Task Order 02-2013—Use of Defence airfields for 
refueling of civilian firefighting aircraft, 8 January 2013, p. 2.  
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Australian  Air  Force  Base  Richmond  on  a  cost  recovery  basis  as  two 




consideration  by  states  of  the  most  efficient  approach  to  obtaining  these 
resources  over  time.  For  example,  a  2010  memorandum  of  understanding 
between  the Commonwealth  of Australia  and Western Australia  states  that 
aircraft refuelling from Royal Australian Air Force supplies during firefighting 
activities will be provided on a cost recovery basis.52 
The implications of the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 
for emergency DACC 
Responsibilities under the Act 




reasonably  practicable,  the  health  and  safety  of  workers  while  they  are  at 
work, and that the health and safety of other persons are not put at risk from 
work  carried  out.  The  duties  of  the  person  conducting  the  business  or 
undertaking include, so far as is reasonably practicable, the: 









52  Military Strategic Commitments (MSC) informed the ANAO that HMAS Albatross does not have any 
agreement with the New South Wales authorities. 
53  Work Health and Safety Act 2011, section 19. 
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52  Military Strategic Commitments (MSC) informed the ANAO that HMAS Albatross does not have any 
agreement with the New South Wales authorities. 
53  Work Health and Safety Act 2011, section 19. 
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out. Workers must  take  reasonable  care  for  their own health and  safety and 
that of other persons while at work, and are obliged  to comply or cooperate 




personnel  developing  and  applying  policies  and  procedures  to  ensure 
compliance  with  the  Act.56  These  implications  extend  to  emergency  DACC, 
which  is often delivered  in  an  environment  subject  to uncertainty,  risks  and 
hazards. For example, emergency DACC tasks are undertaken during bushfire 
and  flood events, and may  involve  the operation of complex equipment and 
the handling of hazardous substances. 
Defence’s overall compliance with the Act 
2.43 At  a  whole‐of‐Defence  level,  Defence  faces  an  ongoing  challenge  in 
achieving compliance with the WHS Act. An internal audit on work health and 
safety was  finalised  in November 2013. The audit  report  concluded  that  ‘the 
requirements  of  the WHS  legislation  are  yet  to  be met  by Defence  and  the 
timeframe for achievement of compliance remains uncertain.’57 The report also 
found that: 
The approach  to  transitioning key Defence policy documents  to  the changed 
legislative requirements was focused on making minor adjustments to existing 
policies. This approach was not appropriate, as  the  fundamental  shift  in  the 
                                                     
54  The WHS Act defines an officer as a person who makes, or participates in making, decisions that 
affect the whole, or a substantial part, of a business or undertaking, but does not include a Minister of 
State. Defence has previously defined an officer as a member of the Defence Committee, which 
includes all Group Heads and Service Chiefs. Workers include any person carrying out work in any 
capacity for a person conducting a business or undertaking, such as employees and contractors. 
55  Work Health and Safety Act 2011, sections 27 and 28. 
56  Under Section 12D of the WHS Act, the CDF may, by instrument in writing, declare that specified 
provisions of the Act do not apply, or apply subject to certain declared modifications, in relation to 
specific activities. This exemption has not been applied in relation to emergency DACC. 
57  Department of Defence, Work Health and Safety — Audit Task — 13-001 — Final Report, 
22 November 2013, p. 4. 
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Defence  Instruction  (General)  PERS  19‐18  ...  requires  conformance with  the 
WHS Manual, however this manual is not yet compliant with the legislation.58 
2.44 During  the  audit,  Defence  informed  the  ANAO  about  its  overall 
approach to work health and safety: 
Each of the Defence Services Chiefs, in their respective capacities as Capability 




which  our  service  personnel  are  imbued  are  often  required  to  be  applied 
quickly,  confidently  and  in  scenarios  of  sometimes  great  duress. Combined 
with  these  specific  skills,  each  service  person  is  drilled  in  applying  their 
respective  skill  sets both  within  a  coherent  team  framework  where  the  full 
command chain  is present  for direction as well as those circumstances where 
disaggregated forces require leaders at each level within the team to be able to 
make  sound  professional  judgements  relating  to  the  safety  of  those  within 
their charge, based upon the circumstances and situations they confront. 







additional  mission  training  and  resources  that  can  be  provided  within  the 
available time frame.59 
                                                     
58  Department of Defence, Work Health and Safety — Audit Task — 13-001 — Final Report, 
22 November 2013, p. 5. 
59  Department of Defence, Defence Assistance to the Civil Community Manual, 2012, paragraph 5.3. 
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59  Department of Defence, Defence Assistance to the Civil Community Manual, 2012, paragraph 5.3. 
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2.46 This  guidance  aims  to  restrict  the  tasks  which  Defence  personnel 
undertake  during  emergency  DACC  events  to  those  for  which  they  are 
appropriately  prepared  or  trained,  thus  minimising  the  risk  of  injury  and 
establishing a primary control to ensure compliance with the WHS Act. 




the  local  Defence  commander,  as  available  personnel  were  not  adequately 
trained or prepared to conduct operations where the risk of asbestos exposure 
was present. However,  the requests were  later  ‘re‐raised at state‐level’ which 
necessitated  time and effort  to explain why  the  requests were not  supported 
and  that correctly equipped and  trained HAZMAT60 removal services should 
be  sought  through  other  avenues.61  In  this  instance  appropriate  action  was 
taken  to ensure  that Defence personnel were not directed  to undertake  tasks 
for which they were not adequately trained or prepared.62 








2.49 The ANAO sought  to obtain examples of  formal risk assessments and 
evidence  that  the  assessment  results  and  controls  had  been  registered  for 
specific  emergency DACC  tasks, as  required by  the DACC Manual. Defence 
did not provide any evidence  that met  the DACC Manual requirements, and 
informed  the  ANAO  that  ‘risk  management  is  inherent  to  the  military 
planning  process’  and  that  ‘unit  commanders will  conduct  hazard  and  risk 
identification,  and  register  at  unit‐level.‘  While  the  ANAO  acknowledges 
                                                     
60  Hazardous Materials. 
61  Department of Defence, Post Operation Report — OP YASI ASSIST, 2–14 February 2011, p. 10. 
62  In 2010 Defence had entered into an enforceable undertaking on hazardous substances with Comcare 
in lieu of prosecution under the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1991. 
63  Department of Defence, Defence Assistance to the Civil Community Manual, 2012, paragraph 5.2. 
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broader  military  planning  processes,  Defence  did  not  provide  evidence  of 
unit‐level  registration  of hazards  and  risks  for  any  of  the  emergency DACC 
tasks  specified  by  the  ANAO.  The  gap  between  the  risk  assessment 
requirements  in  the DACC Manual  and Defence’s operational practices may 
reflect a failure of the DACC Manual to recognise existing WHS controls. 
Existing work health and safety controls 
2.50 The  Code  of  Practice  How  to  Manage  Work  Health  and  Safety  Risks 
identifies situations in which risk assessments may not be necessary, including 
when other guidance sets out a way of controlling the hazard or risk and the 
relevant  controls  are  implemented,  and  when  well  known  and  effective 
controls are in use that are suited to the circumstances.64 This is likely to be the 
case  for  many  emergency  DACC  tasks,  as  the  ADF  maintains  a  range  of 




specifically  developed  or  acquired for  the  circumstances  which  prevail  in 
domestic  emergencies  or  other  domestic  events,  are  nonetheless  readily 
adaptable  for  these  types  of contingencies. However,  over  the  years, 
the Defence  Service  Chiefs  have  taken  great  steps  to  ensure  that  the 
adaptability  of  the  ADF  workforce is  not  exploited  to  the  extent  that 
unreasonable  risk  is  taken  on  in  the  course  of  rendering  assistance. An 
example of where this has been recognised,  is  in wide area bush firefighting. 
While  some elements of Defence  conduct  firefighting  training,  such as naval 
crews  in  various  forms  of  ship  borne  firefighting  and  localised helicopter 
based  aerial  firefighting  specifically  around  the  Naval  Air  Station  Nowra 
hinterland,  the majority of  the ADF  is not  trained  in  firefighting  techniques. 
Consequently,  the ADF does  not  engage  in bush  firefighting  in  rendering 
assistance  to  civilian  communities.  However,  in  years  past,  ADF  personnel 
were deployed  for duties of  this nature despite an absence of  training  in  this 
field. 
Much  of  this change  is  attributable  to  a  much  greater  awareness  of each 
Service  Chief  to  their  obligations  and  responsibilities  under  the  new  WHS 
Legislation as well as the introduction of ever more detailed risk management 
                                                     
64  Safe Work Australia, How to Manage Work Health and Safety Risks Code of Practice, December 
2011, p. 9. 
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64  Safe Work Australia, How to Manage Work Health and Safety Risks Code of Practice, December 
2011, p. 9. 
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of  activities  undertaken  within  the  ADF  and  the  associated  risks  for  each. 
These  same  risk  management  methodologies,  which  include standing  risk 
profiles  for  activities  such  as  ship  borne  helicopter  operations,  low  altitude 
aerial  cargo drops, or Army parachute activities,  to name but a  few, provide 
the basis from which similar risk assessments can be made when skill sets such 
as these are applied in non‐military roles in support of the community. These 
processes, when  combined  with  the  training  of  ADF  personnel  to  make 
sensible judgments regarding the conditions they observe on‐the‐ground or at 
sea or  in  the air, provide a  foundation upon which Defence meets  its overall 
WHS  responsibilities  when  applying  ADF  effort  to  non‐military  civilian 
assistance missions.65 
2.52 In  practice,  when  preparing  personnel  for  emergency  DACC  tasks, 
Defence  relies  on  its  existing  approach  to  skills  development,  as  well  as  a 
broad  range  of  procedural  documentation  related  to  specific  activities 
undertaken  by  ADF  personnel,  and  the  transferability  of  ADF  skills  and 
procedures to DACC tasks. This contrasts with the DACC Manual requirement 
to  conduct  a  ‘formal  risk  assessment’  for  each  DACC  task.  In  light  of 
differences  between  the  existing  approach  and  that  outlined  in  the  current 
version of  the DACC Manual  to manage work health and  safety  risks,  there 
would be benefit in Defence reviewing the need for formal risk assessments for 
all DACC  tasks and clearly documenting  in  the DACC Manual  the measures 
necessary  to  meet  its  obligations  under  the  WHS  Act  when  providing 
emergency DACC. This would  increase  assurance on  the approach  adopted, 
reinforce  individual  roles and  responsibilities, and provide a  firmer basis  for 
monitoring compliance with the WHS Act. 
Conclusion 
2.53 Defence’s  DACC  Manual  includes  clear  policy  and  guidance,  which 
informs  Defence  decision  makers  about  the  circumstances  and  limitations 
applying to the acceptance of DACC requests. The DACC Manual also sets out 
different  emergency  DACC  management  and  administrative  requirements 
according  to  three  ‘categories’  or  types  of  tasks.  The  emergency  DACC 
categories enable local Defence commanders to make on‐the‐ground decisions 
and  apply  base  resources  in  response  to  localised  emergencies  (category  1); 
                                                     
65  Department of Defence, ANAO Performance Audit — Emergency Defence Assistance to the Civil 
Community — Issues Paper, Request for Information, 18 December 2013. 
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and  provide  for  higher  level  Defence  decision  making  and  coordination  in 




property),  or  that  a  cost  ‘waiver’  be  approved  in  limited  ‘special 
circumstances’. However, Defence  has  not  consistently  recovered  or waived 
costs  for  category 3  tasks  in accordance with  the  requirements of  the DACC 
Manual,  reflecting  a generally  immature  approach  to  emergency DACC  cost 
recovery.  Further,  Defence  has  advised  that  it  plans  to  amend  the  DACC 
Manual  to  indicate  that  costs  are  ‘generally  not  recovered  unless  the 
government  recipient  agrees  to  pay  costs’.  If  revised  along  these  lines,  the 
DACC  Manual  will  not  provide  clear  policy  and  guidance  on  the 
circumstances  in which cost recovery  is warranted. The ANAO suggests that, 
in  consultation  with  the  Government,  Defence  review  and  clarify  its  cost 
recovery policy  for  emergency DACC. As part of  the  review, Defence  could 
also  develop  thresholds  for  the  application  of  cost  recovery  to  category  3 
‘recovery’  tasks,  in  terms  of  the  estimated  value  and  type  of  assistance 
provided.  
2.55 The  requirements  of  the  WHS  Act  have  significant  implications  for 
emergency  DACC,  which  is  often  delivered  in  an  environment  subject  to 
uncertainty, risks and hazards. The DACC Manual requires that Defence only 
provide  emergency  DACC  support  when  its  personnel  are  appropriately 







and procedures  to DACC  tasks.  In  light of  the variation between  the DACC 
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3.1 The Defence Assistance  to  the Civil Community Manual  (DACC Manual) 
outlines  policy  and  procedures  for  the  areas  of  Defence  involved  in  the 
administration  of  Defence  Assistance  to  the  Civil  Community  (DACC) 
activities. In addition to this framework, complementary operational strategies 
should  provide  clear  guidance  to  Defence  commanders  and  personnel 






 the  content  and  currency  of Defence’s  emergency DACC  operational 
plans; 
 Defence’s  approach  to  managing  key  relationships  in  the  context  of 
emergency DACC; and 
 assistance provided by Defence as part of  the  emergency  response  to 
the  2013  Queensland  floods,  focusing  on  the  construction  of  a 
temporary  bridge  in  Bundaberg,  and  the  issues  of  coordination, 
stakeholder  management  and  prioritisation  (Case  Study  2:  2013 
Bundaberg floods and temporary bridge construction). 




an  annex  to  the DACC Manual. The  effective delivery  of  emergency DACC 
depends  on  the  quality  of  communication  and  coordination  between  the 
various areas of Defence involved.  
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Table 3.1: Emergency DACC roles and responsibilities 
Defence Office Holder, 
Group or Service 
Emergency DACC responsibility 
Chief of the Defence 
Force (CDF) 
Approve DACC tasks with a direct cost under $100 000. 
Direct formation of a Joint Task Force (JTF). 
Chief Joint Operations 
(CJOPS) 
Command and control of designated emergency DACC 
operations. 
Vice Chief of the Defence 
Force 
Sponsor policy and procedures in the DACC Manual. 
Military Strategic 
Commitments (MSC) 
Ensure emergency DACC policy aligns with Government 
direction. 
Prepare emergency DACC strategy for CDF and Minister for 
Defence approval. 
Service Chiefs  
(Navy, Army, Air Force) 
Assign capabilities to CJOPS for emergency DACC.  
Ensure emergency DACC is recorded in accordance with the 
DACC Manual. 
Head Defence Support 
and Reform Group 
Approve emergency DACC tasks with a direct cost under 
$50 000. 
Provide Group capability to CJOPS for emergency DACC. 
Oversee maintenance of accurate records for emergency DACC.  
Directorate of Operations 
and Training Area 
Management (DOTAM), 
Defence Support and 
Reform Group 
Command and control JOSS. 
Assign Liaison Officers to CJOPS for emergency DACC. 
Collect and maintain emergency DACC reporting data.  
Manager Joint Operations 
Support Staff (JOSS), 
DOTAM 
Primary state government and community point of contact. 
Maintain relationships with emergency management authorities. 
Liaise with requesting organisations and the community. 
Liaise within Defence to facilitate situational awareness.  
Provide Liaison Officers to emergency management centres 
during an emergency. 
Maintain accurate records of approved emergency DACC. 
Senior Australian 
Defence Force Officer 
(SADFO) 
Approve and coordinate category 1 support. 
Maintain situational awareness of DACC tasks and issues. 
Ensure task data detailed in the DACC Manual is provided to the 
relevant JOSS. 
Base Support Manager Liaise with JOSS and emergency management authorities. 
Action approved requests for the use of the Defence estate. 
Report community requests for Defence assistance to the JOSS 
for recording and processing. 
Unit Commanders Approve, command and control category 1 tasks. 
Execute or contribute to CJOPS directed emergency DACC.  
Ensure task data detailed in the DACC Manual is provided to 
JOSS. 
                     Delivery                      Liaison                     Administration 
Source: ANAO analysis of DACC Manual, Chapter 1, Annex B 
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DACC  activities,  which  is  the  responsibility  of  Chief  of  Joint  Operations 
(CJOPS),  the Services, Senior Australian Defence Force Officers  (SADFO) and 
Unit  Commanders.  This  separation  of  roles  and  responsibilities  necessitates 
consultation  and  a  strong  feedback  loop  to  ensure  strategy,  policy  and 






perform  a  formal  liaison  officer  role,  representing  CJOPS  at  the  relevant 
emergency management  centre  and  supporting  situational  awareness within 
the Defence chain of command. The regional JOSS therefore have a pivotal role 
in  working  between  emergency  management  authorities  and  Defence,  to 
understand  emergency  assistance  needs  and  Defence’s  capacity  to  respond, 
which facilitates the effective delivery of emergency DACC. 
3.6 DOTAM and regional JOSS are also responsible for the maintenance of 
accurate  records of DACC  in accordance with  the DACC Manual. This  relies 
on  the provision of accurate and  complete data by  the areas of Defence  that 
undertake DACC  tasks. The  recording and  reporting of details of emergency 
DACC tasks are examined in Chapter 4. 
Operational planning 
3.7 A  set  of  operational  plans  provides  Defence  with  guidance  on  its 
emergency  responses.  They  include  an  overarching  national  plan  which 
provides  standardised  guidance,  supported  by  regional  DACC  plans. 
Defence’s emergency DACC plans are shown in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1: Defence emergency DACC plans 
 
Source: ANAO analysis.  
3.8 Defence’s  CJOPS  issued  the  overarching  national  plan,  known  as 
Operation Plan Charlemagne,  in November  2013. This plan  sets  out CJOPS’ 
approach to enable the Australian Defence Force’s (ADF’s) provision of DACC, 
and  includes  detailed  operational  guidance  for  Defence  commanders  and 
personnel. Matters covered by Operation Plan Charlemagne include: Defence’s 
policy goals  for emergency DACC, such as  its strategic objectives and  intent; 
restrictions or constraints on  the provision of support;  facts and assumptions 
about  the  operating  environment;  and  emergency  DACC  execution 
arrangements,  including  phases,  roles  and  responsibilities.  The  most 
significant  feature  of  the  plan  is  that  it  moves  beyond  the  mainly 
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administrative  guidance  in  the  DACC  Manual  to  in‐depth  operational 
considerations. 
3.9 Regional  plans  reference  the  overarching  national  plan  as  a  guiding 
document, and detail specific procedures for the delivery of emergency DACC 
within  their  respective  area,  taking  into  account  the  environment  and  likely 
threats. The regional plans describe the roles and responsibilities of the various 
organisations  involved  in  emergency management, both within Defence  and 
external to it, including emergency management committees and groups at the 
state, district and local level. 
3.10 As  indicated  in  paragraph  2.51,  Defence’s  DACC  plans  are 
supplemented  by  other policies  and procedural documentation  relating  to  a 
range of tasks undertaken by members of the ADF. Relevant examples include 
mission  risk  profiles  relevant  to  air  support  operations,  standard  operating 
procedures  and  risk  assessment  tools  relevant  to  the  operation  of  specific 
equipment such as vehicles or chainsaws. 
Currency of operational plans 
3.11 Emergency  management  plans  should  be  up‐to‐date,  relevant  and 
reviewed  when  necessary.  This  promotes  consistency  in  administrative 
approaches, supports operational effectiveness and can help avoid uncertainty 
in emergency situations.  
3.12 Operation  Plan  (OPLAN)  Charlemagne  was  released  in  November 
2013,  replacing  the December 2012 Concept Plan  (CONPLAN) Charlemagne. 
Operation  Plan Charlemagne  referenced  current  policy  and  guidance  at  the 
time of its publication. However, Concept Plan Charlemagne did not reference 
the  then  current  version  of  Australian  Government  Disaster  Response  Plan 
(COMDISPLAN)  and  included  out‐of‐date  information  on  reporting 
requirements for emergency DACC tasks. 
3.13 The ANAO  reviewed  the  regional plans shown at Figure 3.1  to check 
their alignment with other relevant emergency DACC policy and procedures. 
While most  plans  had  been  recently  reviewed, many  referenced  out‐of‐date 
versions of COMDISPLAN and overarching plan Charlemagne (see Table 3.2). 
This  highlights  scope  for  better  communication  within,  and  between,  the 
different areas of Defence involved in emergency DACC about agreed policies, 
procedures  and  delivery  approaches.  The  ANAO  suggests  that  Defence 
centrally review the content of regional DACC plans on an annual basis. This 
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Table 3.2: Currency of regional emergency DACC plans 
Regional Plan 







ACT Plan Bluebell 
December 2010 
DI(G) OPS 05-1 






NSW Plan Waratah 
5 April 2013 
DACC Manual  
19 December 2012 
2008 AOC Charlemagne November 2009 
Northern Command 
Plan Celadon 
5 November 2013 
DACC Manual 
19 December 2012 
2013 AOC Charlemagne November 2009 
North QLD Plan 
Ironbark 
25 September 2012 
DACC Manual 
19 December 2012 
No reference AOC Charlemagne November 2009 
South QLD Plan Orchid 
3 May 2013 
DACC Manual  
19 December 2012 
2008 AOC Charlemagne November 2009 
SA Plan Shrike 
31 October 2013 
DACC Manual 
19 December 2012 
2013 CONPLAN Charlemagne 21 December 2012 
TAS Plan Abel 
22 October 2012 
DI(G) OPS 05-1 
16 March 2004 
2010 AOC Charlemagne November 2009 
WA Plan Mace 
12 November 2013 
DACC Manual 
19 December 2012 
2013 CONPLAN Charlemagne 21 December 2012 
VIC Plan Phoenix 
June 2013 
DACC Manual 
19 December 2012 
2008 AOC Charlemagne November 2009 
           Indicates out-of-date material 
Source: ANAO analysis of emergency DACC regional plans. 
Notes: a. DI(G) OPS 05-1 (the Instruction) was replaced by the DACC Manual on 19 December 2012.  
 b. COMDISPLAN versions were issued in 2008, 2010 and 2013. 
 c. Charlemagne versions were issued on 16 November 2009 (AOC), 21 December 2012 
(CONPLAN) and 5 November 2013 (OPLAN). 
Relationship management 
3.14 During  emergency  responses,  Defence  provides  assistance  in 
combination with other professional, volunteer and community organisations. 
Table  3.3  shows  organisations  potentially  involved  in  administration  or 
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provision  of  an  emergency  response.  Sound  professional  relationships  and 
effective  liaison  arrangements  between  participating  organisations  are 
essential for the successful management of emergencies. 
Table 3.3: Organisations involved in emergency DACC responses 
Local and regional government and emergency management authorities 
Local councils, community representatives, local business 




 Emergency Management New South Wales 
 Victorian Department of Justice 
 Queensland Department of Emergency Services 
 Western Australian Fire and Emergency Services Authority 
 South Australian Fire and Emergency Services Commission 
 Tasmanian Department of Police and Emergency Management 
 Australian Capital Territory Emergency Services Agency 
 Northern Territory Police, Fire and Emergency Services 
Other  State police, fire brigades, ambulance service  








 MSC  
 DOTAM 
 JOSS 
 Chief Finance Officer Group 
 Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organisation (AGO) 
Other agencies 
  Australian Government agencies 
 Rural Fire Services 
 Red Cross 
 State Emergency Services 
 Other community organisations 
Source: ANAO analysis.  
Note: This table is intended to provide an indication of the general extent of organisational complexity in 
emergency management when emergency DACC is delivered. It is not exhaustive. 
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regional  emergency  management  authorities,  with  regional  JOSS 
representatives  participating  in  various  state  emergency  management 
planning  activities.  State  emergency  management  authorities  informed  the 
ANAO that this has resulted in greater awareness of Defence’s capability and 
more effects‐based requests  from state and regional groups.66 However,  these 
authorities  also  informed  the  ANAO  that  the  level  of  understanding  of 
Defence’s  role  and  capability  to  respond  is  more  limited  among  local 
government groups and the general public. 
3.16 In  a  similar  vein,  before  the  start  of  the  ‘disaster  season’  (roughly 
November  to  March),  Defence  has  also  recorded  an  assessment  of 
weather‐related  threats  and  reviewed  the  availability  of  its  personnel  and 
assets  to  assist with  possible  requests  for  emergency  assistance.  Since  2011, 
Defence  has  reported  this  information  to  the  Minister  for  Defence.  This 
assessment assists  to  inform government of Defence’s ability  to contribute  to 





the  provision  of  Australian  Government  assistance  during  an  emergency 
through liaison officers embedded with the state emergency services authority 
coordinating the response (see also paragraph 3.5). These  liaison officers help 
communicate  and  coordinate  requests  for  Defence  assistance  so  that  the 
affected  jurisdiction  is  aware  of  the  available  capabilities,  limitations  and 
expected  timeframes  for  the  provision  of  emergency  DACC.  They  can  also 
provide  feedback  to Defence about a  jurisdiction’s capabilities, and  the  likely 
need  for Defence assistance, which assists Defence  to respond  to requests  for 
assistance.67 
3.18 Staff  from  several  state,  local  and  volunteer  emergency management 
organisations  in  New  South  Wales,  Queensland  and  Victoria  demonstrated 
                                                     
66  According to COMDISPLAN 2013, the most effective method of seeking assistance from Defence is to 
define or outline the outcome or result required (the effect to be achieved) rather than to seek 
provision of a specific capability. Defence is then able to consider the usefulness of a broader range of 
its available capabilities to achieve the required effect.  
67  Where there is a high risk of a significant emergency event, CJOPS, through HQJOC, may commence 
response planning. In addition, under COMDISPLAN 2013, EMA may, if required, request the 
pre-positioning of Australian Government resources. 
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need  for Defence assistance, which assists Defence  to respond  to requests  for 
assistance.67 
3.18 Staff  from  several  state,  local  and  volunteer  emergency management 
organisations  in  New  South  Wales,  Queensland  and  Victoria  demonstrated 
                                                     
66  According to COMDISPLAN 2013, the most effective method of seeking assistance from Defence is to 
define or outline the outcome or result required (the effect to be achieved) rather than to seek 
provision of a specific capability. Defence is then able to consider the usefulness of a broader range of 
its available capabilities to achieve the required effect.  
67  Where there is a high risk of a significant emergency event, CJOPS, through HQJOC, may commence 
response planning. In addition, under COMDISPLAN 2013, EMA may, if required, request the 
pre-positioning of Australian Government resources. 
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awareness  of  Defence’s  emergency  DACC  procedures  and  how  to  request 
Defence  assistance.  Of  particular  note,  the  staff  from  the  state  emergency 
management  authorities  demonstrated  a  high‐level  of  knowledge  of 
emergency DACC procedures.  
3.19 DOTAM  staff,  including  JOSS, also demonstrated good knowledge of 
relevant emergency management authority operations, and  the organisations 
involved  in  emergency management  in  their  area. These  staff  indicated  that 
they maintained  effective  and  ongoing  liaison with  emergency management 
authorities. 
Joint Task Forces and situational awareness  
3.20 The coordination of emergency DACC administration and delivery also 
depends  on  effective  relationship  management  information  within  Defence. 
The ANAO considered aspects of Defence’s relationship management during 
(Joint Task Force) JTF and other emergency DACC activities. 
3.21 When  the  level or  expected duration of  emergency DACC  support  is 
anticipated to be extensive, the CDF can decide to form a JTF. As discussed at 
paragraph 2.16, a JTF is composed of assigned or attached elements of two or 
more  Services,  established  for  the purpose  of  carrying  out  a  specific  task  or 
mission. 
3.22 EMA, DOTAM and JOSS noted that during a JTF response, established 
chains of  reporting can be disrupted or  replaced. This can  result  in a  lack of 
situational  awareness  or  understanding  of  the  emergency  response.68  For 
example,  Post  Operation  Reports  for  the  Defence  response  to  the  2013 
Queensland  floods  noted  that  when  the  JTF  was  established,  there  were 
instances when Emergency Management Queensland liaised directly with the 
JTF liaison officer, instead of the established liaison officers from EMA or JOSS. 
This  caused  confusion  as  to  who  was  the  primary  point  of  contact  for 
assistance requests and resulted in a lack of situational awareness in both EMA 
and the South Queensland JOSS office, whose established liaison officers were 




68  The DACC Manual specifies that HQJOC will coordinate activity with EMA in consultation with the 
regional JOSS manager, SADFO, Unit Commander, Service Headquarters/Groups, MSC and if 
appointed, the Commander JTF or the DACC Commander.  
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roles  and  responsibilities  during  JTF  operations  in  the  next  version  of  the 
DACC Manual, which is scheduled for release in mid‐2014. 
3.24 The  DACC  Manual  requires  that  situation  reports  be  provided  to 
HQJOC, MSC, Service Headquarters and the relevant JOSS manager during all 
DACC  tasks,  including  those undertaken by  JTFs. For category 1  tasks,  these 
reports are to be provided as required or requested. For category 2 and 3 tasks, 
the reports are to be provided every 24 hours or as stipulated by either HQJOC 
or MSC. These  reports  are  intended  to  support  awareness of  the  emergency 
and oversight of  the work being undertaken. The DACC Manual  states  that 
MSC will use  the category 2 and 3 situation  reports  to provide advice  to  the 
CDF  and  Minister  for  Defence  as  required.  Defence  provided  evidence  of 
situation  reports  for  several  specific  emergency  DACC  tasks.  The  ANAO 
found  the  reports  to  be  detailed  and  informative.  They  included  frequent 




part  of  the  2013 Queensland  flood  response.  The  case  study  focuses  on  the 
provision of a  temporary  fixed modular bridge  in Bundaberg as a category 3 
task,  and  the  issues  of  coordination,  stakeholder management,  prioritisation 
and cost recovery which can arise in the emergency DACC context. 
Case Study 2: 2013 Bundaberg floods and temporary 
bridge construction  
3.26 Tropical  Cyclone  Oswald  reached  the  coast  of  Queensland  on 
21 January 2013  and  caused  heavy  flooding  along  the  east  coast  from 
Rockhampton  to  the  New  South  Wales  border.  On  27  January  2013,  the 
Queensland  Government  requested  Australian  Government  assistance  in 
responding  to  the  flooding  created  by  the  cyclone. On  28  January  2013,  the 
CDF  established  JTF  63769,  codenamed  Operation  QUEENSLAND  FLOOD 
ASSIST  II,  to  command and execute Defence’s emergency  response. Manned 
primarily by Brisbane’s 7th Brigade, JTF 637’s mission was to: 
                                                     
69  Prior to the establishment of JTF 637, elements of 16 Aviation Brigade had been deployed to assist in 
evacuation activities in Bundaberg, Queensland.  
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Support disaster  relief efforts  in SE QLD and N NSW  from  [8am 28  January 
2013]  until  task  complete  [in  order  to]  assist  the  local  government  and 
community as required.70 
3.27 During the operational peak, JTF 637 comprised 363 Defence personnel 




 two Royal Australian Air  Force  fuel  tankers  and  personnel  to  refuel 
aircraft  supporting  the  flood  relief  effort  in Bundaberg  (3520 litres  of 
fuel were provided); 
 four Blackhawk helicopters  to provide  evacuation  assistance, damage 
assessment and support for recovery efforts; 
 four Kiowa helicopters  to  supply  food  in  isolated  rural  locations and 
undertake reconnaissance missions to assess road conditions; 
 Royal  Australian  Air  Force  C‐130J,  KA350  and  C‐17A  aircraft  to 
transport  emergency  stores  and  equipment,  and  undertake  aero 
medical evacuations; 
 engineering  equipment  to  support  road  clearance  tasks  and  rubbish 
removal; 
 engineering inspection of levees, weirs and roads; 
 engineering  support  to  assist  Bundaberg  council  with  electrical  and 
plumbing tasks; and 
 engineering material and support to construct a temporary bridge. 
Temporary bridge repair in Bundaberg 
3.28 One  of  the  major  assistance  tasks  provided  by  Defence  in 





70  Department of Defence, JTF 637 — QUEENSLAND FLOOD ASSIST II Post Operation Report, 2 April 
2013, p. 4.  
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one  of  the  roads  that  connect  North  and  South  Bundaberg  (see  Figure  3.2 
below), and was described as a  ‘vital route for community and heavy vehicle 
movement’ in a Defence briefing to the Minister. 
Figure 3.2: Defence operational schematic for the Bundaberg bridges 
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engineers determined  that  a  fixed modular bridge would be  suitable  for  the 
task, and construction began on 6 February 2013, with the bridge open to the 
public on 7 February 2013. 
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Figure 3.3: Construction of the fixed modular bridge by 2nd Combat 
Engineer Regiment 
 
Source: Australian Army, Operation QUEENSLAND FLOOD ASSIST II, [Internet], Defence, available from 
<http://www.army.gov.au/Our-work/Community-engagement/Disaster-relief-at-home/Operation-QUEENSLA
ND-FLOOD-ASSIST-II> [accessed 5 July 2013]. 
3.30 The  fixed modular bridge  consisted of  a  large  temporary  steel girder 
that spanned 21 meters over the gap, which allowed light vehicles, such as cars 
and  four wheel drives,  to  safely use  the bridge.71  In  total, 53  full‐time Army 
personnel  were  involved  in  erecting  the  temporary  bridge.  In  addition,  the 
actual materials for the fixed modular bridge were transported 1020 kilometres 
at a cost of $34 135. 





71  News Mail, 8 February 2013, Northbound Lane on Tallon Bridge opened to light traffic [Internet], 
available from <http://www.news-mail.com.au/news/northbound-lane-tallon-bridge-opened-light 
-traffic/1747361/> [accessed 29 August 2013]. 
72  News Mail, 29 July 2013, Tallon Bridge works finish early [Internet], available from 
<http://www.news-mail.com.au/news/tallon-bridge-works-finish-early/1961945/>  
[accessed 29 August 2013]. 
  
ANAO Audit Report No.24 2013–14 
Emergency Defence Assistance to the Civil Community 
 
70 





3.33 Defence  reported  in  a  Ministerial  submission  that  the  final  cost  to 
install and dismantle the temporary bridge was $265 335. 
3.34 The activity was classified as DACC category 3, which, according to the 
DACC  Manual,  is  subject  to  cost  recovery.  As  previously  discussed  in 
paragraph 2.24,  the DACC Manual states  that waivers should only be sought 
where  there  are  ‘special  circumstances’.  However,  Defence’s  cost  waiver 
submission drafted on 7 February 2013 did not explain why Defence pursued a 
waiver, instead of seeking to recover costs from the Queensland Government. 
The  cost waiver was  approved  by  the Minister  for Defence  on  12  February. 
Defence  informed  the ANAO  that  the  costs were waived because  the bridge 
construction was considered a ‘Government directed task’.73 
Managing stakeholder expectations 
3.35 In two situation reports dated 30 January 2013, the Commander of the 
JTF  highlighted  challenges  relating  to  stakeholder  expectations.  The  issues 
raised related to state government requests for Defence to undertake a diverse 
and  at  times  ‘vague’  range  of  tasks,  and  the  need  to  advise  the  state 
government  that  ‘resources have been committed  to structured  tasks  that are 
consistent with DACC  [policy]’. Among  the  large number of  tasks  requested 
by  local  authorities  and  the  state  government  was  the  request  to  provide 








73  ‘Special circumstances’ may include tasks with significant public affairs, recruiting or training value to 
Defence, or a task of a one-off nature involving only a minor cost.’ Defence, DACC Manual, 19 
December 2012, paragraph 6.25. 
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73  ‘Special circumstances’ may include tasks with significant public affairs, recruiting or training value to 
Defence, or a task of a one-off nature involving only a minor cost.’ Defence, DACC Manual, 19 
December 2012, paragraph 6.25. 
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Defence  would  be  very  short‐term  and  could  delay  a  more  permanent 
solution. Further, a second bridge between North and South Bundaberg was 
open and able  to  take  traffic  in close proximity  (less  than 700 metres)  to  the 
Don Tallon Bridge. 
3.37 Defence  further  informed  the  ANAO  that  following  a  discussion 
between  the  then Minister  for Defence and  the CDF on 2 February 2013,  the 
CDF approved Defence support to build the temporary bridge. The decision to 




3.38 A  set  of  operational  plans  provides  Defence  with  guidance  on  its 
emergency  responses.  They  include  an  overarching  national  plan 
(Charlemagne), which provides standardised guidance, supported by regional 
DACC  plans.  The most  significant  feature  of  these  plans  is  that  they move 
beyond  the  mainly  administrative  guidance  in  the  DACC  Manual  to 
operational  considerations,  such  as  execution  arrangements  and phases,  and 
the roles and responsibilities of various emergency management organisations 
across Australia. While most of these plans had recently been updated, many 
still  contained  references  to  out‐of‐date  material,  such  as  old  versions  of 
COMDISPLAN and Defence’s overarching national plan  (Charlemagne). This 
highlights scope  for better communication within, and between,  the different 
areas  of  Defence  involved  in  emergency  DACC  about  agreed  policies, 




3.39 Each  regional  Joint  Operations  Support  Staff  (JOSS)  office  has 
appointed  Defence  liaison  officers  to  engage  with  emergency  management 
authorities in the area. The ANAO noted evidence of regular contact between 
relevant  Defence  personnel  and  state  and  regional  emergency  management 
authorities, with  regional  JOSS  representatives  participating  in  various  state 
emergency  management  planning  activities.  State  emergency  management 
authorities  informed  the  ANAO  that  this  resulted  in  greater  awareness  of 
Defence’s  capability  and  more  effects‐based  requests  for  Defence  assistance 
from state and regional groups. 
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in  each  state,  JOSS  coordinate  the provision of Defence  assistance during an 
emergency,  through  liaison  officers  embedded  with  the  state  emergency 
services  authority  coordinating  the  response.  These  liaison  officers  help 
communicate  and  coordinate  requests  for  Defence  assistance  so  that  the 
affected  jurisdiction  is  aware  of  the  available  capabilities,  limitations  and 
expected  timeframes  for  the  provision  of  emergency  DACC.  They  can  also 
provide  feedback  to Defence about a  jurisdiction’s capabilities, and  the  likely 
need for Defence assistance, which assists Defence to prepare for and respond 
to  requests  for assistance. Nevertheless, EMA, DOTAM and  JOSS noted  that 
during  an  emergency  DACC  operation  led  by  a  JTF,  established  chains  of 
reporting can be disrupted or replaced. This can result in a lack of situational 
awareness or understanding of the emergency response. Defence informed the 
ANAO  that  it  intends  to  document  liaison  officer  roles  and  responsibilities 
during  JTF  operations  in  the  next  version  of  the  DACC  Manual,  which  is 
scheduled for release in mid‐2014. 
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4. Recording and Reporting 
Emergency Assistance 
This  chapter  examines  Defence’s  records  of  emergency  assistance  tasks,  external 
reporting on emergency assistance, and operational evaluation and lessons learned. 
Introduction 
4.1 Defence  has  established  mandatory  reporting  for  emergency  DACC 
tasks intended to capture details of the work undertaken, including resources 
utilised and costs. Accurate records of emergency DACC tasks provide a basis 
for  reporting  on  the  overall  resource  impact,  cost  and  effectiveness  of  the 
support provided by Defence. 
4.2 As indicated in Table 3.1, a range of Defence office holders, Groups and 
Services  have  responsibilities  in  the  areas  of  DACC  policy,  strategy, 
procedures  and  delivery.  The  identification  and  dissemination  of  lessons 
learned from emergency DACC activities provides for a strong feedback loop 








 a  case  study  on  assistance  provided  by  Defence  as  part  of  the  2009 
Victorian bushfires known  as  ‘Black  Saturday’,  focusing  on  reporting 
and the identification of lessons learned. 
Recording details of emergency DACC 
4.4 Defence  Instructions  (General) OPS  05–1: Defence Assistance  to  the  Civil 
Community  —  policy  and  procedures  (the  Instruction)  set  out  mandatory 
reporting  requirements  for  emergency  DACC  tasks,  which  applied  until 
19 December 2012. Under the Instruction, a Post Task Report was required to 
be  completed  and  supplied  to  the  relevant Defence Groups  and Emergency 
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Management Australia  (EMA) within  two weeks  after  the  completion of  the 
task. The  Instruction  identified 17  information  fields  that a Post Task Report 
must contain. These ranged  from  the  task’s registration number and delivery 
dates,  to more detailed  information  including a  task description,  the Defence 
unit(s)  and  number  of  personnel  involved,  and  resources  utilised.  The 
information captured in Post Task Reports was intended to be used by Defence 
to  quantify  total  resources  utilised  and  expenditure  made  in  providing 
emergency DACC. 
4.5 The December  2012 Defence Assistance  to  the Civil Community Manual 
(DACC Manual)  introduced  revised  reporting  arrangements, with Post Task 
Reports  no  longer  mandatory.  The  DACC  Manual  specifies  21  information 
fields  to  be  completed  for  each  DACC  task,  which  are  similar  to  those 
previously required by the Instruction. Under the Manual, this  information  is 
to be mainly supplied by the Defence unit(s) undertaking the task, the unit(s) 
supplying  assets  and  Joint  Operational  Support  Staff  (JOSS).  Unit 
Commanders are  to  ensure  that  their  input  is provided  to  the  relevant  JOSS 
within 28 days of the end of the task. Drawing on this information, DOTAM is 
responsible  for  maintaining  a  database  containing  DACC  task  information 
through its regional JOSS offices. 
4.6 Figure 4.1 shows Defence’s current procedures  for reporting details of 
emergency  DACC  tasks,  from  the  initial  registration  of  a  task  through  to 
reporting on emergency DACC in Defence’s Annual Reports. 
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information captured in Post Task Reports was intended to be used by Defence 
to  quantify  total  resources  utilised  and  expenditure  made  in  providing 
emergency DACC. 
4.5 The December  2012 Defence Assistance  to  the Civil Community Manual 
(DACC Manual)  introduced  revised  reporting  arrangements, with Post Task 
Reports  no  longer  mandatory.  The  DACC  Manual  specifies  21  information 
fields  to  be  completed  for  each  DACC  task,  which  are  similar  to  those 
previously required by the Instruction. Under the Manual, this  information  is 
to be mainly supplied by the Defence unit(s) undertaking the task, the unit(s) 
supplying  assets  and  Joint  Operational  Support  Staff  (JOSS).  Unit 
Commanders are  to  ensure  that  their  input  is provided  to  the  relevant  JOSS 
within 28 days of the end of the task. Drawing on this information, DOTAM is 
responsible  for  maintaining  a  database  containing  DACC  task  information 
through its regional JOSS offices. 
4.6 Figure 4.1 shows Defence’s current procedures  for reporting details of 
emergency  DACC  tasks,  from  the  initial  registration  of  a  task  through  to 
reporting on emergency DACC in Defence’s Annual Reports. 
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Figure 4.1:  Emergency DACC reporting structure 
 
Source: ANAO summary of data in the DACC Manual, Chapter 7. 
Note: Although DOTAM is required to maintain DACC data for annual and periodic reporting, in practice 
DOTAM has not been asked to provide DACC data for inclusion in the Defence Annual Report. 
This is discussed further at paragraph 4.33. 
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Completeness of emergency DACC task information 
4.7 Post  Task  Reports  were  not  available  for  the  majority  of  emergency 
DACC  tasks undertaken by Defence between  July 2009 and December 2012.74 
Defence did provide  the ANAO with a number of  reports  completed by  the 




4.8 Each  JOSS  office maintains  an  annual DACC  register  for  the  region, 
which is to contain the information fields required by the DACC Manual (and 
previously  the  Instruction)  for  each  DACC  task.  The  ANAO  requested  the 
annual DACC  registers  compiled by  the  regional  JOSS offices  for  the period 
2005–06  to  2012–13.  Most  of  the  DACC  registers  prior  to  2009–10  were 
incomplete, or  the  regional  JOSS office no  longer held  the  register.  JOSS did 
provide emergency DACC registers from 2009–10 to 2012–13. 
4.9 The ANAO’s analysis of  the available annual DACC registers showed 
that  the  task  information  contained  in  them  varied  between  states;  did  not 
meet the requirements of the Instruction or the DACC Manual; and was often 
incomplete.76 Key  information  frequently missing  from  the  registers  included 
the  duration  of  assistance,  the  Defence  unit(s)  and  number  of  personnel 
involved, and the costs associated with the task.  
4.10 During  discussions  with  the  ANAO,  Defence  personnel  noted  that 
many  DACC  category  1  tasks  authorised  by  the  relevant  Senior  Australian 
Defence Force Officer (SADFO) or Unit Commander77 may not be reported to 
JOSS,  contrary  to  the  extant  DACC  guidance.  Further,  JOSS  informed  the 
ANAO  that  when  a  JTF  is  established  for  large‐scale  emergency  DACC 
operations, JOSS must pursue required task information through Headquarters 
Joint  Operations  Command  (HQJOC)  and  sometimes  does  not  receive 
complete information related to all tasks undertaken. Based on these findings, 
                                                     
74  As discussed in paragraph 4.4, Post Task Reports were mandatory until 19 December 2012. 
75  These reports were often referred to as Post Operation Reports. They provided a detailed account of 
the operation, including mission statements, command and control structures and key events. 
76  DOTAM reached a similar conclusion following an internal review in mid-2012 of the accuracy of the 
DACC registers. 
77  The Instruction and the extant DACC Manual allow authorisation of category 1 tasks by a SADFO or 
Unit Commander. 
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4.11 The  2004  Instruction  assigned  responsibility  for  maintenance  of  a 
DACC  activity  database  to  the  then  Corporate  Services  and  Infrastructure 
Group. The  2012 DACC Manual has  retained  the database  requirement  and 
assigned the responsibility for its maintenance to DOTAM through its regional 
JOSS offices. However,  in May 2013, DOTAM  informed  the ANAO  that  this 
database did not exist and had not been  funded.78 Since  that  time a database 
has been developed by DOTAM and it was activated on 16 December 2013, in 
the  course  of  the  audit.  It  will  take  some  time  to  determine  whether  the 
implementation of the database results in improved DACC recordkeeping. 
4.12 The shortcomings  in Defence’s DACC recordkeeping mean  that  it has 
incomplete  records  of  the  tasks  undertaken,  resources  allocated  and 
expenditure  incurred  on  emergency  DACC  activity  between  2005–06  and 
2012–13. This detracts from Defence’s ability to accurately recall the details of 
work  undertaken  should  this  be  necessary  for  the  purposes  of  advising 
government,  accounting  to  the Parliament,  evaluating  activity or  subsequent 
scrutiny of Defence activities.79 It also does not support Defence’s planning for 
future emergency assistance. 
Causes of incomplete emergency DACC task information  
4.13 Staff  from several  JOSS offices  informed  the ANAO  that  they did not 
routinely receive DACC task information as mandated by the DACC Manual, 
and  that  they  often  used  other  avenues  to  acquire  the  information  from 
responsible  areas  of  Defence.  For  example,  JOSS  may  receive  information 
regarding  the  completion  of  emergency  DACC  tasks  through  JOSS  liaison 
officers,  follow‐up  phone  calls,  emails  and  other  means.  While  the  DACC 
Manual  assigns  clear  responsibilities  for  the  provision  of  DACC  task 
information, DOTAM noted  that  it does not have  the authority  to  insist  that 
responsible areas of Defence submit the required information.  
4.14 Emergency DACC has  largely been focused on response, with a  lesser 
priority given  to  records management  and  reporting. Discussions with  JOSS 
                                                     
78  On 1 July 2013, DOTAM implemented an interim spreadsheet to collect the required data sets. 
79  Scrutiny can include legal proceedings, work health and safety and compensation claims, audits and 
public inquiries.  
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 loss  of  records  during  the  migration  from  individual  recordkeeping 
systems to Defence’s mandated electronic filing system.  
4.15 For many years Defence has had detailed  reporting  requirements  for 
DACC  tasks, and  for many years  these requirements have not been met on a 
consistent basis. This  raises questions  for Defence about  the balance between 
the benefits  for DACC planning and public accountability of capturing more 
comprehensive  information,  and  the  risks  in  not  capturing  certain  task 
information.  Against  this  background,  Defence  should  review  reporting 
requirements to ensure they represent the minimum information necessary to: 
identify  the  nature  and  cost  of  emergency DACC  tasks,  undertake  any  cost 
recovery, discharge accountability obligations, maintain reasonable records for 
future  use  and  learn  from  emergency DACC  activities. Defence  should  also 
take  steps  to  strengthen  the  priority  afforded  by  Defence  commanders  and 
personnel to meeting those reporting requirements. 
4.16 Defence’s  development  of  a  national  DACC  database  is  a  positive 
development  (see  paragraph  4.11).  However,  if  Defence  does  not  also  take 
steps  to  strengthen  the  priority  afforded  by  Defence  commanders  and 
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Recommendation No.1  
4.17 To promote  the  efficient  and  effective use  of Australian Government 
resources  in  the  administration  of  emergency  assistance  to  the  civil 
community, the ANAO recommends that Defence: 




 take  steps  to  strengthen  the  priority  afforded  by  Defence  units  to 
meeting these reporting requirements. 
Defence response: Agreed 
Emergency DACC tasks from 2009–10 to 2012–13 
4.18 Using the available data, the ANAO analysed the number and type of 
emergency DACC tasks recorded from 2009–10 to 2012–13 (Figure 4.2). In total, 
169  tasks were  recorded during  the period. Category  1  tasks were  the most 
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Figure 4.2: Number of emergency DACC tasks recorded by JOSS, by 
category, 2009–10 to 2012–13 
 




emergency  DACC  tasks  undertaken  in  Queensland  is  an  indication  of  the 
severity  of  natural  disasters  that  have  occurred  in  that  state  since  2009–10. 
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Figure 4.3: Number of emergency DACC tasks recorded by JOSS, by 
region, 2009–10 to 2012–13 
 
Source: ANAO analysis of JOSS annual registers. 
Note: Records of emergency DACC tasks in Northern Territory and South Australia were not available 
(see paragraph 4.21).  
4.20 Figure 4.3  shows  that  the Western Australia  JOSS office  recorded  the 
highest  number  of  emergency  DACC  tasks  during  the  period  (per  region). 
From 2009–10  to 2012–13, Western Australia accounted  for 51 per cent of  the 
category 1  tasks  recorded across Australia. One possible explanation  for  this 
statistic is that the administrative processes associated with emergency DACC 
tasks were more stringently adhered  to  in Western Australia, resulting  in  the 
full range of DACC tasks being recorded, whereas other state records were not 
so rigorously maintained. 
4.21 No emergency DACC  tasks were  recorded  for  the Northern Territory 
and South Australia  from 2009–10  to 2012–13.  In  the Northern Territory and 
the northern part of Western Australia, the responsibility for emergency DACC 
lies with Headquarters Northern Command,  rather  than  JOSS.  In September 
2013, Northern Command  informed  the ANAO  that  it  did  not maintain  an 
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two occasions80, and EMA  reported  three  instances of  requests  for assistance 
sent  to Northern Command. As discussed  in paragraph  4.12,  the  absence  of 
accurate  records means  that Defence does not have a  clear understanding of 
the nature of emergency DACC provided or the cost of that assistance. 
Funding and cost of emergency DACC 
4.22 Portfolio  Budget  Statements  inform  the  Parliament  and  the  public 
about the resources available and the planned performance of each Australian 
Government agency against specified outcomes. The Defence Portfolio Budget 
Statement  for  2013–14  includes  the  provision  of  DACC  as  part  of  its  third 
outcome,  which  is  ‘support  to  the  Australian  community  and  civilian 
authorities  as  requested  by  government.’  Outcome  3  includes  search  and 
rescue,  emergency  disaster  response  and  recovery,  surveillance,  security, 
reconstruction and development. 
4.23 While  the  total  appropriation  for  Defence’s  Outcome  3  is 
$16.933 million for 2013–1481, this amount does not relate to emergency DACC. 





4.24 An  exception  to  the  guidance  provided  in  the  DACC  Manual  was 
outlined  at  the  June  2013  Senate  Estimates  hearings  by  the  Secretary  of  the 
Department of Defence: 
As  a  general  rule,  if  [Defence]  provide  assistance  in  Australia  in  [an] 
operation  or  in  the  region  in  an  operation,  and  it  is  under  $10 million, 
                                                     
80  Northern Command provided two documents regarding past DACC assistance. These were a Post 
Activity Report for category 1 support to a bushfire in Howard Springs (September 2010), and a 
Ministerial Submission detailing the upgrade of DACC activity from category 1 to category 2 during 
Tropical Cyclone Carlos (2011). It was not possible to count the number of DACC tasks undertaken on 
these occasions, and therefore a number has not been included in Figure 4.3.  
81  Department of Defence, Portfolio Budget Statements 2013-14, Agency Resources and Planned 
Performance, [Internet] p. 89, Defence, available from: <http://www.defence.gov.au/budget/13-14/pbs/ 
2013-2014_Defence_PBS_03_Defence.pdf>, [accessed 11 October 2013]. 
82  Department of Defence, Defence Assistance to the Civil Community Manual, 2012, paragraph 6.3.  
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4.26 Defence has described  the  impact of DACC on  its budget as marginal 
because  it  largely  involves  the  provision  of  personnel,  which  does  not 
constitute  additional  expenditure.86  Nevertheless,  Defence  does  not  have  an 
understanding  of  the  overall  costs  of  its DACC  activities  because  it  has  not 
recorded  costs  for many DACC  tasks. Defence  should also keep  in view  the 
opportunity cost associated with the  time spent by Defence commanders and 




back  many  years.  In  1999–2000  the  ANAO  completed  a  performance  audit 
which  examined  Defence’s  costing  of  its  emergency  responses.  The  audit 
found that: 
Defence  does  not  collect  and  quantify  the  cost  of  all  DACC  assistance  as 
operational  commanders  do  not  always  provide  the  required  reports  to 
HQAST [Headquarters Australian Theatre] on task completion ... 
The  inadequacies  of  the  DACC  information  base  have  implications  for  the 
management  of  this  function  including  the  support  for  effective  policy 
generation  as well as  the  ability of Defence  to  charge  for  services provided, 
and to plan and manage the allocation of resources to DACC tasks. The ANAO 
considers that Defence should enforce ... required DACC reports and monitor 
the  costs  associated  with  the  provision  of  DACC.  Enhanced  management 
                                                     
83  Commonwealth, Senate Estimates, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, 4 June 
2013, D Richardson, Secretary for Defence, p. 48.  
84  For example, in 2007–08, Defence received $12.3 million in supplementary funding for Operation 
OUTREACH, which was conducted in support of the Northern Territory Emergency Response. 
85  The 2012 DOTAM internal review of DACC records found that none of the regional JOSS offices was 
accurately reporting details of costs and cost recovery for emergency DACC tasks. 
86  Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Review of the Defence Annual 
Report 2011–12, June 2013, p. 26.  
 
 
ANAO Audit Report No.24 2013–14 




two occasions80, and EMA  reported  three  instances of  requests  for assistance 
sent  to Northern Command. As discussed  in paragraph  4.12,  the  absence  of 
accurate  records means  that Defence does not have a  clear understanding of 
the nature of emergency DACC provided or the cost of that assistance. 
Funding and cost of emergency DACC 
4.22 Portfolio  Budget  Statements  inform  the  Parliament  and  the  public 
about the resources available and the planned performance of each Australian 
Government agency against specified outcomes. The Defence Portfolio Budget 
Statement  for  2013–14  includes  the  provision  of  DACC  as  part  of  its  third 
outcome,  which  is  ‘support  to  the  Australian  community  and  civilian 
authorities  as  requested  by  government.’  Outcome  3  includes  search  and 
rescue,  emergency  disaster  response  and  recovery,  surveillance,  security, 
reconstruction and development. 
4.23 While  the  total  appropriation  for  Defence’s  Outcome  3  is 
$16.933 million for 2013–1481, this amount does not relate to emergency DACC. 





4.24 An  exception  to  the  guidance  provided  in  the  DACC  Manual  was 
outlined  at  the  June  2013  Senate  Estimates  hearings  by  the  Secretary  of  the 
Department of Defence: 
As  a  general  rule,  if  [Defence]  provide  assistance  in  Australia  in  [an] 
operation  or  in  the  region  in  an  operation,  and  it  is  under  $10 million, 
                                                     
80  Northern Command provided two documents regarding past DACC assistance. These were a Post 
Activity Report for category 1 support to a bushfire in Howard Springs (September 2010), and a 
Ministerial Submission detailing the upgrade of DACC activity from category 1 to category 2 during 
Tropical Cyclone Carlos (2011). It was not possible to count the number of DACC tasks undertaken on 
these occasions, and therefore a number has not been included in Figure 4.3.  
81  Department of Defence, Portfolio Budget Statements 2013-14, Agency Resources and Planned 
Performance, [Internet] p. 89, Defence, available from: <http://www.defence.gov.au/budget/13-14/pbs/ 
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82  Department of Defence, Defence Assistance to the Civil Community Manual, 2012, paragraph 6.3.  
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4.28 The  1999–2000  ANAO  performance  audit  recommended  that  to 
improve the cost effectiveness of emergency DACC, Defence should regularly 
monitor  the  costs  associated  with  the  provision  of  DACC  and  enforce  the 




4.29 Further,  in 2009 Defence conducted an  internal audit of DACC policy, 
approvals and processes, which listed one of the deficiencies as ‘the absence of 
a  single  corporate database  for  the  identification  and  reporting of  the  actual 
cost  to  Defence  of  each  DACC  activity.’90  The  lack  of  a  single  corporate 
database  has  restrained  Defence’s  ability  to  maintain  accurate  records  of 
emergency DACC. In July 2013, DOTAM issued a spreadsheet to regional JOSS 
offices  to  assist  with  the  collection  of  standardised  DACC  data,  and  in 
December 2013 activated a DACC database, which is intended to enable more 
accurate DACC reporting (see also paragraph 4.11). 
4.30 In  summary,  some  14  years  after  shortcomings  in  Defence’s 
quantification  of  DACC  costs  were  identified  by  the  ANAO,  there  remains 
limited cost data. While  the amounts  involved are  low  relative  to  the overall 
Defence  budget,  in  a  resource  constrained  environment,  a  better 
understanding of the cost drivers and complete costs of emergency DACC over 
time would assist Defence to pursue efficiencies in delivery approaches. 
4.31 As  noted  in  the  ANAO’s  2012–13  performance  audit,  Defence’s 
Implementation  of  Audit  Recommendations,  by  not  implementing  agreed  audit 
recommendations,  ‘Defence  is  forgoing  opportunities  to  enhance  its 
performance’.91 
                                                     
87  ANAO Audit Report No.41, 1999–2000, Commonwealth Emergency Management Arrangements, 
pp. 59–60. 
88  ibid., p. 60. 
89  Headquarters Australian Theatre is now known as Headquarters Joint Operations Command 
(HQJOC). 
90  Department of Defence, Defence Assistance to the Civil Community — Policy, Approvals, processes 
— Audit Task 09/006, Final Audit Report, p. 6.  
91  ANAO Audit Report No. 25, 2012–13, Defence’s Implementation of Audit Recommendations, p. 15. 
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approvals and processes, which listed one of the deficiencies as ‘the absence of 
a  single  corporate database  for  the  identification  and  reporting of  the  actual 
cost  to  Defence  of  each  DACC  activity.’90  The  lack  of  a  single  corporate 
database  has  restrained  Defence’s  ability  to  maintain  accurate  records  of 
emergency DACC. In July 2013, DOTAM issued a spreadsheet to regional JOSS 
offices  to  assist  with  the  collection  of  standardised  DACC  data,  and  in 
December 2013 activated a DACC database, which is intended to enable more 
accurate DACC reporting (see also paragraph 4.11). 
4.30 In  summary,  some  14  years  after  shortcomings  in  Defence’s 
quantification  of  DACC  costs  were  identified  by  the  ANAO,  there  remains 
limited cost data. While  the amounts  involved are  low  relative  to  the overall 
Defence  budget,  in  a  resource  constrained  environment,  a  better 
understanding of the cost drivers and complete costs of emergency DACC over 
time would assist Defence to pursue efficiencies in delivery approaches. 
4.31 As  noted  in  the  ANAO’s  2012–13  performance  audit,  Defence’s 
Implementation  of  Audit  Recommendations,  by  not  implementing  agreed  audit 
recommendations,  ‘Defence  is  forgoing  opportunities  to  enhance  its 
performance’.91 
                                                     
87  ANAO Audit Report No.41, 1999–2000, Commonwealth Emergency Management Arrangements, 
pp. 59–60. 
88  ibid., p. 60. 
89  Headquarters Australian Theatre is now known as Headquarters Joint Operations Command 
(HQJOC). 
90  Department of Defence, Defence Assistance to the Civil Community — Policy, Approvals, processes 
— Audit Task 09/006, Final Audit Report, p. 6.  
91  ANAO Audit Report No. 25, 2012–13, Defence’s Implementation of Audit Recommendations, p. 15. 
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Reporting on emergency DACC in Defence’s Annual 
Report 
4.32 The  Defence  Annual  Report  is  the  primary  reporting  mechanism  to 
inform  the Parliament and  the public about DACC activities.  In  the past,  the 
Instruction  required  information  contained  in  the  DACC  database  to  be 
provided to Command Headquarters for review. Command Headquarters was 
then  responsible  for  completing  an  annual  register  of  DACC  tasks,  and 
forwarding  it to Headquarters Australian Theatre for  inclusion  in the Annual 
Report. However, as discussed  in paragraph 4.11, a DACC database was not 
implemented until December 2013.  
4.33 The  2012  DACC  Manual  states  that  DOTAM  is  to  be  prepared  to 
provide the data on all DACC activities undertaken by Defence to  inform the 
Annual  Report  and  other  reports  as  required.  Notwithstanding  this 
requirement,  DOTAM  informed  the  ANAO  that  it  had  not  been  asked  to 
provide  information on DACC activity  for  such purposes.  Instead,  the Chief 
Finance  Officer  Group  is  responsible  for  the  compilation  of  Outcome  3 
information for inclusion in the Annual Report. 
4.34 In Annual Reports prior  to 2008–09, Defence  recorded  the number of 
DACC tasks internally reported92, but not the costs of providing the assistance. 







4.35 Commencing  in  2008–09,  Defence  has  reported  the  total  cost  of 
Outcome 3  in  its Annual Report,  including amounts which are not related  to 




92  As discussed in paragraphs 4.9, 4.10 and 4.21, shortcomings in internal reporting mean that Defence 
cannot confirm the actual number of emergency DACC tasks undertaken. 
93  Department of Defence, Annual Report 2007–08, Appendix 13, p. 259, [Internet], Defence, available 
from <http://www.defence.gov.au/budget/07-08/dar/2007-2008_Defence_DAR_13_v1_full.pdf> 
[accessed 1 November 2013]. 
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Report  drawing  on  the  cost  of  DACC  operations  led  by  a  JTF.  Costs  are 
attributed  to  these  operations using  specific  codes  called  fund numbers  and 
internal  orders.94  Table  4.1  shows  Annual  Report  entries  relating  to  DACC 
tasks and costs since 2006–07. The Defence Annual Report also includes some 
qualitative  information  on  significant  emergency DACC  tasks.  For  example, 
the  2012–13 Annual Report described  the  assistance provided by Defence  in 
January  2013  to  communities  threatened by bushfires  in Tasmania  and New 
South Wales. 




Description Number of 
DACC tasks 
Net costb 
2006–07 DACC category 1 11 Not reported 
DACC category 2 2 
2007–08 DACC category 1 27 Not reported 
DACC category 2 2 
2008–09  Operations Resolute, Solania, Outreacha, 
Vic Fire Assist 
Not reported $14 557 000 
2009–10  Operation Resolute Not reported $10 620 000 
2010–11  Operations Resolute, Queensland Flood 
Assist, Yasi Assist 
 Assistance to Vic floods 
Not recorded $10 762 000 
2011–12  Flood relief in NSW, QLD and Vic 
 Support to CHOGM 
 Support to US President visit 
Not recorded $18 461 000 
2012–13  Operation Resolute 
 Flood/fire relief in NSW, QLD, WA and 
Vic 
Not recorded $15 182 000 
Source: ANAO analysis of DACC related entries in Defence Annual Reports.  
Note a: Operations Resolute and Solania, and support to CHOGM and the US President visit, are included 
in Outcome 3, but are not DACC activities.  
Note b: Net cost does not include the cost of personnel. 
                                                     
94  When a Joint Task Force is established, a specific fund number is allocated to which all costs 
attributable to the tasks performed by that particular task force are billed, providing a record of funds 
expended. 
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4.36 The approach adopted by Defence  in  its reporting of details of DACC 
tasks in the Annual Report means that: 
 emergency DACC costs are not separately reported. The reported costs 
include  all  DACC  tasks  allocated  specific  codes,  and  also  include 
border control and security operations; and 
 DACC costs  included  in Outcome 3 do not  include emergency DACC 
conducted without allocation of a specific fund number. 
4.37 Defence  could  better  inform  the  Parliament  and  the  public  about 
emergency DACC by capturing more complete data on work undertaken and 
drawing  on  this  information  for  the Annual Report. Future Defence Annual 
Reports  could  usefully  contain  additional  detail  on  the  number  and  cost  of 
Defence  activity  for  each  of  the  main  forms  of  assistance  provided  under 
Outcome 3, including emergency disaster response and recovery.  
Operational evaluation and lessons learned 
4.38 Defence  has  long  recognised  the  benefits  of  evaluating  and  learning 
from its operations:  
Operations  provide  special  opportunities  to  gather  knowledge  because  they 
are  not  constrained,  structured  or  scripted  in  the manner  of most  collective 




4.39 ANAO  Audit  Report  No.1,  2011–12,  The  Australian  Defence  Force’s 
Mechanisms for Learning from Operational Activities, focused on the systems and 
processes  the  ADF  uses  for  identifying  and  acting  on  lessons,  and  for 
evaluating performance. The audit concluded that: 
Defence has structures in place to learn from operations and exercises, and in 
recent  years  there  have  been  attempts  to  improve  these  as  Defence  has 
recognised  their  importance. However,  the application of  the ADF’s  learning 
framework is patchy and fragmented. …  
The key ADF‐wide  information  system provided  in  1999  to  support  lessons 
and evaluations [the Australian Defence Force Activity and Analysis Database 
                                                     
95  Australian Defence Headquarters, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 00.4—Operational 
Evaluation, August 2007, p. 9. 
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was  considering  how  it might  best  coordinate  existing  Service‐level  lessons 
agencies  in order  to assist  in  the planning and  evaluation of operations and 
exercises.96 
4.40 The  ANAO  Audit  Report  included  five  recommendations  to 
consolidate and  improve  the  focus of  the ADF’s mechanisms  for  lessons and 
operational  evaluation,  including  through  the  application  of  consistent 
methods of analysing and sharing  lessons  (Recommendation No.1)97, and  the 
use of knowledge management repositories (Recommendation No.2).98 
4.41 In  the  course of  this  audit,  the ANAO  sought  additional  information 
from Defence on implementation of the recommendations made in the 2011–12 
audit into operational evaluation and lessons learned. While Defence informed 
the ANAO  about  a  range  of  activities  to  strengthen  the  approach  it  uses  to 
evaluate  and  learn  from  operations,  this  remains  work  in  progress.  Of 
particular  note,  the  initial  roll‐out  of  a  Defence‐wide  system  for  managing 
lessons learned is planned for July 2014, and Defence evaluation doctrine and 
procedures are being revised.  
Emergency DACC activity review and lessons learned 
4.42 The  emergent  nature  of  emergency  DACC  tasks  means  that  it  is 
difficult  to  develop  and  apply  objective  measures  of  performance. 




their  discretion  and  for  their  own  use,  and  that  HQJOC  may  seek  a  Post 
                                                     
96  ANAO Audit Report No.1 2011–12, The Australian Defence Force’s Mechanisms for Learning from 
Operational Activities, p. 19. 
97  Recommendation No.1 was that to improve their ability to learn from operations and exercises, the 
Services put in place consistent methods for identifying, analysing, implementing and validating 
lessons, and ensure that relevant lessons can be effectively shared across Services.  
98  Recommendation No.2 was that to support an ADF-wide approach to learning from operations and 
exercises, the ADF establish a clear role and scope for future operational knowledge management 
repositories, and develop a clear plan for capturing and migrating relevant existing information. 
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were  generally  completed  following  the  larger  emergency DACC  responses. 
These  reports  included  details  of  the  operation,  lessons  learned  and 
recommendations.100  
4.43 In addition, HQJOC has run a Lessons Board following the end of the 
annual disaster  season. The Lessons Board  considers  analysis  of key  themes 
arising from Post Activity Reports, and recommends improvements to DACC 
procedures and activities. The ANAO considers that the Lessons Board process 
is  a  potentially  valuable  mechanism  to  drive  improvement  in  delivery  of 
emergency  DACC,  provided  there  is  appropriate  follow‐up  on  the  matters 
identified by the Board.  
4.44 While  lessons  recorded  in  Post  Activity  Reports  are  to  be  reviewed 









During  2013,  HQJOC  has  managed  the  lessons  process  for  a  number  of 
operations and activities,  including  the ADF’s  support  to  the Department of 
Immigration and Citizenship, DACC and Defence humanitarian and disaster 





4.46 Collection  and  analysis  of  lessons  learned,  and  the  subsequent 
identification of improvement actions, have been long‐term issues for Defence. 
                                                     
99  Reports reviewed by the ANAO were given a variety of titles, including Post Activity Report, Post 
Operation Report, Headquarters Joint Operations Lessons Board, After Action Report, and DACC 
Summative Report. 
100  The ANAO reviewed Post Activity Reports for the 2009 Victorian bushfires, Cyclone Yasi in 2011, the 
Victorian Floods in 2011, the New South Wales bushfires in 2013 and Cyclone Oswald in 2013. 
101  Department of Defence, Concept Plan Charlemagne, December 2012, p. 15. 
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The  implementation  of  a  Defence–wide  management  system  for  lessons 
learned  is  an  important  step  in  creating  an  integrated  approach  to  the 
management  of  lessons  learned  from  Defence  operations.  As  part  of  this 
approach,  incorporation  of  findings  from  the  DACC  Lessons  Board  will 
potentially  lead  to  improvements  in  the  delivery  and  administration  of 
emergency DACC.  
4.47 The  following  case  study  provides  a  brief  account  of  assistance 
provided by Defence personnel as part of the 2009 Victorian bushfires known 
as  ‘Black  Saturday’.  It  focuses  on  the  extensive  level  of  support  provided, 
reporting and the identification of lessons learned. 




was  described  as  ‘tinder‐dry’  after  prolonged  heatwaves  over  the  summer 
period created dangerous fire conditions.102 On 7 February the Black Saturday 
fires broke out, ultimately claiming  the  lives of 173 people,  injuring a  further 
822  people,  affecting  over  78 communities,  destroying  2029  houses  and 
burning over 400 000 hectares. 
4.49 The  State Government  of Victoria  led  a major  response  to  the  Black 
Saturday  bushfires,  which  included  firefighters  from  many  government 
agencies (including from interstate and overseas), police, ambulance and other 
emergency service workers, volunteers and  industry brigades. On 8 February 
2009,  Australian  Government  Disaster  Response  Plan  (COMDISPLAN)  was 
activated  by  the Commonwealth Attorney‐General’s Department  to  provide 
Australian Government assistance to the State of Victoria. 
Defence assistance 
4.50 Defence  support  to  the  Black  Saturday  disaster  response  was 
codenamed Operation VIC FIRE ASSIST. On 8 February 2009, Defence formed 
JTF 662  to coordinate Defence’s  response  to  requests  for assistance. This was 
the  first  time  a  JTF  had  been  established  by  an  Army  Reserve  Brigade  to 
                                                     
102  J Brumby quoted from M Moncrief, ‘Worst day in history’: Brumby warns of extreme temperature 
forecast [Internet], The Age, 6 February 2009, available from <http://www.theage.com.au/national/ 
worst-day-in-history-brumby-warns-of-fire-danger-20090206-7zf1.html> [accessed June 2013]. 
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102  J Brumby quoted from M Moncrief, ‘Worst day in history’: Brumby warns of extreme temperature 
forecast [Internet], The Age, 6 February 2009, available from <http://www.theage.com.au/national/ 
worst-day-in-history-brumby-warns-of-fire-danger-20090206-7zf1.html> [accessed June 2013]. 
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4.51 There  were  approximately  450  Defence  personnel  operating  in  nine 
locations  across  Victoria  within  48  hours  of  the  establishment  of  the  JTF.103 
Defence’s  emergency  assistance  reached  a  peak  operational  strength  of 
approximately  800  Defence  personnel  per  day104,  and  over  1250  Defence 
personnel provided assistance over the seven weeks of the operation.  
4.52 The Victorian State Emergency Response Centre prepared 20  requests 
for  Australian  Government  physical  assistance.  The  task  requests  were 
assessed by EMA and forwarded to Defence for actioning.105 Defence personnel 
provided  extensive  engineering,  logistics  and  medical  support  to  affected 
communities.106 The main activities undertaken by Defence under  JTF 662 are 
summarised in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2:  Operational statistics for Joint Task Force 662 
Type of activity Extent of activity 
Creation of containment lines 75 kilometres 
Buried animal carcasses 150 
Buried fish 20 tonnes 
Route clearance 35 kilometres 
Rapid Impact Assessments Over 300 sites 
Searching facilities/houses 817 locations 
Psychological contacts with fire affected 
civilians Over 200 civilians  
Psychological counselling for fire affected 
civilians Over 30 civilians 
Psychological assessments of Defence 
personnel Over 400 personnel assessed 
Reconnaissance and provision of imagery Two AP–3C Orion aircraft 
                                                     
103  J Fetchik, ‘”Left and right of arc:” the legal position of the Australian Defence Force in domestic 
disaster response using the 2009 “Black Saturday” Victorian bushfires as a case study’, The Australian 
Journal of Emergency Management, Volume 27, No. 2, 2012, p. 34. 
104  Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 2008–09, Volume 1, 2009, p. 137. 
105  One request was removed before any action was taken and three requests were subsequently 
cancelled.  
106  The tasks were all undertaken by specialised task groups within JTF 662. 
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Type of activity Extent of activity 
Water points established  Three 
Equipment moved 260 tonnes 
Other activities and resources 
Establishment of JTF headquarters, deployment of Defence liaison officers, emergency 
accommodation, and setting up emergency relief facilities that provided health services, water 
distribution and sanitation operations. 
Source: JTF 662 Post Operation Report: Operation VIC FIRES ASSIST, pp. 11–15 and 43.  
4.53 Figure  4.4  shows  an  aerial  photograph  taken  from  a Defence AP‐3C 
Orion aircraft over one of the fire fronts assessing the speed and size of the fire. 
Figure 4.4:  AP-3C Orion providing aerial imagery of Black Saturday 
 
Source: Department of Defence, Operation Vic Fire Assist [Internet], February 2009, available from 
<http://www.defence.gov.au/opex/global/opvicfire/images/20090218a/index.htm>, [accessed 
August 2013]. 
4.54 Defence  assistance  during  the  Black  Saturday  bushfire  emergency 
response was characterised by the rapid mobilisation of a large number of JTF 
personnel,  the  provision  of  extensive  engineering,  logistics  and  medical 
support, and the utilisation of specialist military equipment. 
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support, and the utilisation of specialist military equipment. 
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Reporting and lessons learned 








Defence’s  activities.  However,  it  did  not  meet  the  task  information 
requirements of the Instruction in full. 
4.58 The Post Operation Report outlined 29  recommendations  in  the main 
body of  the  report, with  further  recommendations  contained  throughout  the 
annexes of  the report. The recommendations covered a broad range of  issues 
including  command and  control,  civil‐military  cooperation and  training. The 
report stated that ‘Key lessons have been recorded in ADFAADS‘. However, as 
discussed previously at paragraph 4.44, ADFAADS is no longer in use, and as 
a  consequence  the ANAO was not able  to access  information on progress  in 
implementing the 29 recommendations. The cessation of the use of ADFAADS 
has  resulted  in  a  potential  accountability  gap  emerging  in  respect  to  the 
monitoring and implementation of recommendations and lessons learned from 
emergency DACC activities. 
4.59 As discussed  in paragraph  4.41, Defence  is  currently  implementing  a 
new system  for managing  lessons  learned, which  is expected  to commence a 
phased roll‐out in July 2014. It will be important to ensure that the transfer of 
                                                     
107  Commonwealth of Australia, House of Representatives Parliamentary Debates, 11 February 2009, 
The Hon. K Rudd MP, Prime Minister, p. 944.  
108  Post Task Reports were a mandatory requirement of the Instruction, discussed at paragraph 4.4, 
which was current at the time of Operation VIC FIRE ASSIST.  
109  The Post Operation Report differed from a Post Task Report and did not include all of the task 
information required by the Instruction.  
  
ANAO Audit Report No.24 2013–14 






4.60 The  Instruction  of  2004  and  the  DACC  Manual  of  2012  imposed 
extensive  reporting  requirements  for  individual  DACC  tasks.  With  few 
exceptions,  these  requirements  have  not  been  met  by  responsible  areas  of 
Defence  on  a  consistent  basis.  This  raises  questions  for  Defence  about  the 
balance between the benefits for DACC planning and public accountability of 
capturing  more  comprehensive  information,  and  the  risks  in  not  capturing 
certain  task  information.  Against  this  background,  Defence  should  review 
reporting  requirements  to  ensure  they  represent  the  minimum  information 
necessary to: identify the nature and cost of emergency DACC tasks, undertake 
any  cost  recovery,  discharge  accountability  obligations, maintain  reasonable 
records  for  future  use  and  learn  from  emergency  DACC  activities.  Defence 
should  also  take  steps  to  strengthen  the  priority  afforded  by  Defence 
commanders  and  personnel  to  meeting  the  reporting  requirements  that  are 
determined to be appropriate. 
4.61 Defence has described  the  impact of DACC on  its budget as marginal 
because  it  largely  involves  the  provision  of  personnel,  which  does  not 
constitute  additional  expenditure.  Nevertheless,  Defence  does  not  have  an 
understanding of  the overall  costs of  its DACC  activities, because  it has not 
captured accurate costing data  for DACC activities undertaken.  In a resource 
constrained  environment,  a  better  understanding  of  the  cost  drivers  and 
complete costs of emergency DACC over time would assist Defence to pursue 
efficiencies  in  delivery  approaches.  Defence  should  also  keep  in  view  the 
opportunity cost associated with the  time spent by Defence commanders and 
personnel preparing for and undertaking emergency DACC tasks. 
4.62 Defence  does  not  have  a  set  of  objective  performance  measures  to 
assess  the  efficiency  and  effectiveness  of  emergency  DACC,  reflecting  the 
emergent nature of activities. Defence has completed Post Activity Reports for 
major  emergency  DACC  operations,  and  HQJOC  has  run  a  Lessons  Board 
following  the  end of  the annual disaster  season, which  considers analysis of 
key  themes  arising  from  the  Post  Activity  Reports,  and  recommends 
improvements  to DACC procedures and activities. However,  the elements of 
Defence’s  emergency DACC  evaluation  and  feedback  loop  are not  currently 
supported by  an  information  system  to  record  and manage key  lessons  and 
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recommendations  arising  from  DACC  activities.  Collection  and  analysis  of 
lessons  learned,  and  the  subsequent  identification  of  improvement  actions, 
have  been  long‐term  issues  for  Defence.  The  implementation  of  a 
Defence‐wide  management  system  for  lessons  learned,  due  for  initial 
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Better Practice Guides 
The following Better Practice Guides are available on the ANAO website: 
Implementing Better Practice Grants Administration  Dec. 2013 
Human Resource Management Information Systems: Risks and controls  June 2013 
Preparation of Financial Statements by Public Sector Entities  June 2013 
Public Sector Internal Audit: An investment in assurance and business 
improvement 
Sept. 2012 
Public Sector Environmental Management: Reducing the environmental 
impacts of public sector operations 
Apr. 2012 
Developing and Managing Contracts: Getting the right outcome, 
achieving value for money 
Feb. 2012 
Public Sector Audit Committees: Independent assurance and advice for 
chief executives and boards 
Aug. 2011 
Fraud Control in Australian Government Entities  Mar. 2011 
Strategic and Operational Management of Assets by Public Sector 
Entities: Delivering agreed outcomes through an efficient and optimal 
asset base 
Sept. 2010 
Planning and Approving Projects – an Executive Perspective: Setting the 
foundation for results 
June 2010 
Innovation in the Public Sector: Enabling better performance, driving new 
directions 
Dec. 2009 
SAP ECC 6.0: Security and control  June 2009 
Business Continuity Management: Building resilience in public sector 
entities 
June 2009 
Developing and Managing Internal Budgets  June 2008 
Agency Management of Parliamentary Workflow  May 2008 
Fairness and Transparency in Purchasing Decisions: Probity in Australian 
Government procurement 
Aug. 2007 
Administering Regulation  Mar. 2007 
Implementation of Programme and Policy Initiatives: Making 
implementation matter 
Oct. 2006 
 
 
 
  
 
